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INTrOdUCTION
Established in 1921, the venerable General Accounting Office of the United States of America 
changed its name in 2004 to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).  Why? First, as the 
investigative arm of Congress, the GAO was always more than an accounting agency. Second, 
given the present unsavory reputation of some accounting firms and some accounting practices, 
it was wise and timely of the GAO to dump that word with all its baggage. Third, it was clever 
of the GAO to change two words in its title and still keep the GAO symbols—symbols of 
nonpartisan fairness, balance, and toughness. Fourth, and most important, by replacing accounting 
with accountability in its title, the GAO associated itself with one of the most powerful symbols in 
modern politics and administration.1
Public accountability, in ordinary and traditional usage, refers to grand acts of account giving like 
the War Crimes Trials in Nuremberg, Germany, the International Military Tribunal for the East 
in Japan following World War Two, or the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa after 
the collapse of apartheid. In everyday usage, accountability refers to or describes the process 
and results of one person settling up or getting right with another.  While still used in this way, 
accountability now has far broader meanings. 
It seems that accountability is the air we breathe, the oxygen of politics, and the hope of 
administration. In short, accountability is the word that is eating government.  According to 
proponents of accountability-centered reforms, enhanced accountability will (among other things) 
result in greater transparency and openness in a world threatened by the powerful forces of 
hierarchy and bureaucratization, greater access to impartial arenas where abuses of authority 
can be challenged and judged, increased pressure and oversight that will promote more ethical 
and appropriate behavior on the part of public officials, and further improvements in the quality 
of government service. Most important for the purposes of this essay, accountability will bring 
formal and precise measures of performance to government so the public can know how well 
their government is meeting public expectations. 
1  For an explanation of the GAO name change, see the comment of then-Comptroller General David M. Walker 
(2004):  “I am not suggesting that agencies need to change their names—but most of them do need to come to grips with 
the fact that some of their most basic policies, processes, and procedures are years out of date. We at GAO have a proud 
history, but we are not defined solely by our past. We will still be known as GAO, but our new name will make clear that 
our first priority is to improve the performance of the federal government and ensure its accountability to Congress and 
the American people.”
4Modern applications of accountability carry with them promises of enhanced democracy, greater 
justice, more ethical behavior, and improved government performance.  Among these, it is the last 
claim—that modern applications of accountability will improve government performance—that 
we find most interesting, because that claim is at the core of what governments are supposed 
to do.  We ask: Is there a basis for the assumed relationship between accountability and public 
organizational performance? Will greater accountability mean improved public organizational 
performance? Will improved public organizational performance guarantee greater accountability? 
If so, how, and to whom? 
We find it puzzling and troubling that, although a direct and clear positive relationship between 
accountability and improved public organizational performance has not been widely explored, 
proponents of public-sector reforms based on performance measurement assume it. Both 
accountability and public organizational performance, particularly performance measurement, are 
part of the wider body of so-called “new public management” (NPM) administrative reforms, and 
in those reforms the words performance and accountability tend to be used interchangeably and to 
mean approximately the same thing. In the circles of government and public affairs there is, then, 
an influential and vocal accountability and performance-measurement reform hegemony (Radin 
2006). While such reformist rhetoric is well intentioned as a means for justifying and energizing 
the changes that advocates prefer, proselytizing to “the gospel of accountability” is not conducive 
to thoughtful reflection or analysis.
The purpose of this monograph is to unpack the concepts and perspectives upon which the logic 
of accountability and performance rest. This examination of the foundations of accountability 
and performance reaches for a clarification of meanings and with that clarification attempts 
a reasoned evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the assumed association between 
accountability and performance in both theory and application. To aid in this evaluation we 
employ the example of the application of accountability and public organizational performance 
to the so-called Extended S tate, the modern practice of outsourcing to third-party contractors 
and grantees the organization, management, and implementation of governmental projects and 
programs.  We choose this example out of the conviction that the contemporary Extended State 
is a particularly vexing challenge to the application of accountability concepts and performance-
measurement protocols. 
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We start by presenting a framework for 
understanding the nature of contemporary 
accountability and the problems associated with 
it as applied in the modern extended form of the 
Administrative State. The basic argument we make 
is straightforward: the current problems associated 
with accountability in the Extended State are 
rooted in a widely held but unsubstantiated belief 
in the capacity of accountability mechanisms 
alone to bring about the three things we require of our government today—efficient control, 
democratic legitimacy, and effective performance.  We call this the “promises of accountability” 
framework. It reflects the view that (more often than not) policies are passed and programs 
designed based on untested assumptions (i.e., promises) about what accountability mechanisms 
can accomplish. We contend that the problematic governance of today’s increasingly powerful 
Extended State is tied to the idea that the wide range of accountability mechanisms we apply in 
efforts to achieve those three core objectives of governance are in and of themselves sufficient to 
achieve them.  
It is within the general framework presented in the next section of the monograph that we 
also try to expand our understanding of the complex relationship between accountability and 
performance. We follow this with an overview of the three major objectives of accountable 
governance (i.e., control, legitimacy, and performance), and after discussing each in turn we turn 
to the case of performance measurement in the Extended State. Finally, we make the case for an 
approach through which the promise of accountability (as well as the other promises) might  
be achieved.
The Promises of Accountability
Accountability is both a word and a bundle of concepts.  As a word, accountability is notoriously 
ambiguous (Brooks 1995), chameleon-like (Sinclair 1995), and its synonymic nature—that 
is, its capacity to stand in for a range of other strong terms, such as responsibility, liability, 
responsiveness—render it subject to rhetorical uses and abuses. In recent years it has also taken 
The basic argument we make is 
straightforward: the current problems 
associated with accountability in the 
Extended State are rooted in a widely 
held but unsubstantiated belief in the 
capacity of accountability mechanisms 
alone to bring about the three things we 
require of our government today—efficient 
control, democratic legitimacy, and effective 
performance.
6on an icon-like symbolic power, used too often to manipulate political forces (Dubnick 2002). It 
is notable, however, that the word is etymologically of recent vintage, emerging in 12th-century 
English from Norman French origins.2 Yet, conceptually the idea underlying the word has been 
around for centuries, allowing many historians to speak of accountability found in the governance 
of ancient regimes.3
Despite this ambiguity and conceptual looseness, we need to establish (at least at the outset) a 
working definition for accountability. For present purposes we will assume a simple, traditional 
view of accountability as a launching point for the promises of accountability schema presented 
below.  Accountability can be approached as having two major definable characteristics: (1) it is a 
social relationship between at least two parties (2) in which at least one party to the relationship 
perceives a demand or expectation for account giving between the two.  This definition highlights 
the fact that accountability is social in nature—it must involve two or more individuals to come 
into play in any relationship.4 That relationship, however, need not be explicit or involve the active 
or ongoing engagement of both parties; rather, the demand for account giving needs to be assumed 
(i.e., expected and accepted) by at least one of the parties in the perceived relationship.5
For example, consider the case of two individuals (let’s call them Mary and Joe) who are complete 
strangers in all other respects except for the fact that they both pass the same four-way stop 
intersection at approximately the same time each morning on their commute to work. Despite 
being total strangers, as licensed drivers they operate their vehicles within the social setting 
created by traffic laws.  As they approach the intersection at the same time, each expects and 
assumes the other feels accountable for their behavior at the intersection and will come to a 
full and complete stop.  At the same time, each possesses a sense of being accountable for their 
2  Dubnick (1998) argues that the term is “anglican”—so much so that it had no equivalent even in the Romance 
languages—not even French, from which it is derived—until recently. Instead, most languages treated the English (for 
translation purposes) as a variation of responsibility.
3  For example, see Roberts (1982) and Elster (1999) on accountability in ancient Greece; Ezzamel (1997) 
examines accounting and accountability in ancient Egypt. 
4  In that sense, the attribution that someone is accountable is similar to saying that she is influential or 
powerful: implied in such characterizations is the question “to whom?” The frequent confusion between accountability and 
responsibility may rest on this point. Responsibility can imply the “to whom?” question, but it primarily focuses attention 
on “for what?”; in contrast, accountability can imply “for what?” but draws one initially to the “to whom?” query. For a 
related discussion, see Uhr (1999).
5  This is a subtle but important point because it puts aside any notion that someone is inherently or existentially 
accountable.  At the individual level, it restricts our attention to at minimum an unreciprocated “felt accountability,” which 
involves at least a perceived relationship with an “other.” On the role of “otherness” in accountability, see Shearer (2002) 
and (for a more philosophical perspective) Butler (2001).
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actions at the intersection. The ever so brief (and one hopes safe) relationship at that intersection 
is a classic instance of simple and effective accountability. Had either momentarily abandoned or 
lost the sense of accountability—e.g., had Mary blatantly ignored the stop sign and crashed into 
Joe’s car—she would be held to account for her actions because the event occurred within the 
frame of an established social relationship.  Joe, relying on the mechanisms provided by the laws 
of the jurisdiction, would have the ability to hold Mary to account, and Mary (given the fact that 
she was a licensed driver) would submit to being held to account. Of course, Mary might offer Joe 
some explanation or excuse for the accident (“a fallen tree branch hid the stop sign from view”), 
but that does not mean she is not subject to being held to account.
Most often, daily instances of accountable 
relationships are most clearly in evidence after an 
event, such as a car accident or other mishap, that 
involves perceived errors of choice or judgment 
on the part of one party to a social relationship. 
Under this view, the accountability is typically 
associated with actions taken “after the fact” or 
post factum to an accountable matter or event. 
This common perspective is frequently applied 
to more complex situations. It includes post-
factum reconsideration of big policy choices like 
the decision to incarcerate Japanese Americans during World War Two or the decision to use 
atomic weapons on Japanese cities in that war.  Traditional accountability also includes post-
factum attempts to fix responsibility for perceived human errors, such as those thought to have 
caused the Challenger and Columbia space program disasters. It also encompasses efforts to fix 
responsibility for ineffective governmental responses to unanticipated events such as the Katrina 
and Rita hurricanes in 2005 and other natural disasters, as well as man-made disasters like the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
What we often forget is that those post-factum responses are premised on the existence of pre-
factum, or before-the-fact, expectations and assumptions about the behavior of individuals, groups, 
and even nations. Relationships based on accountability, whether perceived as the ability to hold 
Most often, daily instances of accountable 
relationships are most clearly in evidence 
after an event, such as a car accident 
or other mishap, that involves perceived 
errors of choice or judgment on the part 
of one party to a social relationship. Under 
this view, the accountability is typically 
associated with actions taken “after the 
fact” or post factum to an accountable 
matter or event. This common perspective 
is frequently applied to more complex 
situations.
8someone to account or the capacity to be held to account, require an awareness and appreciation 
of both pre-factum and post-factum dimensions.  As we will argue later in this monograph, break 
or qualify the link between the two—that is, disconnect the accountability relationship from 
its social, legal, or even moral setting—and what you have is something that is accountability 
in name only.  We believe that such a disconnect has occurred in the general effort to enhance 
accountability, and that the source of the problem can be traced to the emergence of what we 
term the “promises” of accountability.
To fully appreciate the power of the promises of accountability that we discuss below, we need 
to highlight another feature of the pre- and post-factum connection. To deal with this, let’s 
return to our intersection where both Mary and Joe have dutifully come to full and complete 
stops at exactly the same time, but this time they are joined (at precisely the same moment) by 
a third vehicle driven be Eloise and a fourth driven by Carl. Each contemplates the next move 
since the general rule (the vehicle in the intersection first has right of way) does not apply, nor 
does the common secondary rule (the vehicle furthest to the right should proceed). Finally Joe 
steps on the accelerator pedal just as Mary has decided to do the same. Despite the existence 
of pre-factum accountability in the form of traffic rules and norms, the resulting accident raises 
issues about who is at fault under these circumstances.  After a number of such incidents over 
a period of time, local residents and other regular commuters urge community policymakers 
to do something to address the problem.  The fact that Mary and Joe are working out the issue 
of post-factum accountability through the legal system is not enough, and there is a call for 
some modification of pre-factum conditions to deal with the situation, hopefully to prevent a 
recurrence. Since replacing the stop signs with a traffic signal would prove too expensive for the 
community and the existing rules are not always relevant, the traffic engineers suggest posting a 
sign that reads “Proceed with caution and courtesy” under each stop sign.
What this little fictional narrative highlights is something that is central to the emphasis we 
increasingly place on accountability-based reforms.  When we call for changes in policies and 
programs in order to enhance accountability, we are primarily focused on modifying pre-factum 
accountability.  Whether it involves posting signs of caution, requiring certain forms be filed, or 
the passage of a “three strikes” law that mandates harsher sentences for repeat offenders, what 
we are attempting to do is prevent or preclude post-factum accountability through changes in 
pre-factum accountability settings.
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When we consider the push for greater accountability in the public sector, our attention is 
usually drawn to efforts aimed at public administration.6 Historically, there have been three major 
problem areas where calls for greater accountability have had a major impact. The first is the 
problem of government efficiency and productivity. For more than a century, reformers have 
pursued a range of changes that would enhance the ability of public agencies to control and rein 
in “waste, fraud, and abuse.” This problem normally affects the organizational setting within which 
government conducts its business, and for present purposes we call this the “problem  
of control.” 
The second problem, unique to work of governments, reflects the fact that public administration 
in the United States must operate within a system of governance defined by its commitment to 
democratic norms and values that give public programs and policies their legitimacy. In fact, we 
term this the “problem of legitimacy.” 
Finally, beyond the push for greater legitimacy and efficient productivity, government 
administrators are under pressure to ensure that the outcomes of their programs and policies 
are effective—and that they perform up to the expectations of the wide range of stakeholders 
that are invested in the work of government. Here we discuss the “problem of performance.”
As we elaborate below, the problems and challenges generated by each of these government 
settings (see Table 1) have created a demand for both more and different forms of accountability, 
some post-factum (e.g., stricter enforcement of existing rules and regulations) but most of the 
pre-factum sort. These pre-factum forms involve taking steps designed to “cause” individuals or 
agencies to assume an account-giving attitude or posture “before the fact,” thereby motivating 
them to act accountably either in the present or the future. 
6  In many ways the American judicial system, based on the rule of law, is a large-scale accountability system. 
Because of the vastness of the judicial system and because we are focusing on organizational, performance-based, and 
democratic process accountability, we do not include it here. The logic of due process is designed to guarantee just 
treatment at the bar.  The American judicial system—the police, the courts, jails and prisons, probation and parole—
are elaborate and complex systems of bringing citizens to account for their actions. In this dense complexity the 
accountability promises of fairness or equity are vexing. Justice is one thing, fairness is another. Fairness issues tend to be 
policy specific, as in fair housing, equal schooling, and so forth. In this policy specificity, fairness issues also tend to manifest 
themselves at the stage of policy implementation and are laden with accountability questions. The splendid recent field 
research by Steven Maynard-Moody and Michael Musheno details the vexing accountability choices faced by police officers, 
teachers, and counselors as they make choices between clients in the context of scarce time and resources (Maynard-
Moody and Musheno 2003). Fairness and justice at the street level are artifacts of bureaucratic accountability, as line-level 
agents practice a kind of accountability triage, as they sort through claims of need and worthiness on one hand and 
resources on the other.
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In a very significant sense, many of these pre-factum 
arrangements reflect a general expectation that 
things can and do go wrong—that “stuff” happens, 
whether in the form of human errors, natural 
disasters, or some other unanticipated events. 
Thus, the roles and significance of pre-factum 
mechanisms in today’s governance structures cannot 
be overestimated and certainly not ignored. Some of 
them are quite visible, often seeming like ritualistic 
demonstrations of deference of the accountable 
official to those to whom she or he is accountable 
(e.g., the State of the Union/State/City addresses 
given annually by elected executives can be seen in this light). At the other end of the spectrum 
are mundane and almost invisible mechanisms, such as required record keeping and audits, which 
almost every public entity must maintain and submit to on a regular basis. These are commonplace, 
pervasive, and frequently invisible until, usually as a result of some misfeasance or malfeasance or 
“act of nature,” things run amiss.  At that point the most subtle forms of pre-factum mechanisms—
the record keeping, the annual audits, the retained e-mails—become the basis for investigations, fault 
finding, blaming, shaming—as well as explaining, excuse making, disclaimers, justification, and other 
means by which the gaps between administrative actions and policy or program expectations were 
bridged. 
Setting Seeking Focus on Problem of
Organizational
Order and compliance 





programmatic ends (e.g., 






(e.g., greater participation, 
transparency)
Processes Legitimacy
TABLE 1: Problems of Accountability
The problems and challenges generated 
by each of these government settings 
have created a demand for both more 
and different forms of accountability, some 
post-factum (e.g., stricter enforcement of 
existing rules and regulations) but most 
of the pre-factum sort. These pre-factum 
forms involve taking steps designed to 
“cause” individuals or agencies to assume 
an account-giving attitude or posture 
“before the fact,” thereby motivating them 
to act accountably either in the present or 
the future.
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But as important as pre-factum mechanisms have become in the effort to reform government, 
they have also became a source of problems and dysfunctions even greater than those they 
were designed to tackle. As a result of the relative success of these pre-factum mechanisms in 
dealing with the problems of control, legitimacy, and performance, advocates of reform often 
have been lured into assuming that it was the pre-factum mechanisms per se that were the keys 
to accountable governance. Rather than treat the pre-factum accountability mechanism as one 
among several factors and contingencies that improved control, legitimacy, or performance, they 
begin to approach it as a sufficient (post hoc, ergo propter hoc) condition for successful reforms. 
The result can be seen in one of two patterns developed in the treatment of accountability. On 
the one hand, pre- and post-factum mechanisms became completely decoupled, and the pre 
factum come to be regarded as managerial and policy tools sufficient unto themselves to bring 
about the appropriate or desired degrees of control, legitimacy, and performance. Thus, if you 
wish to have more ethical behavior and less corruption, establish a code of ethics or make the 
relevant parties sign a formal acknowledgement that they understand their responsibilities and 
will adhere to ethical and legal standards of conduct. 
On the other hand, the relationship between pre- and post-factum mechanisms gets turned 
on its head, with instances of post-factum accountability being used in support of (enhancing 
the influence of) pre-factum mechanisms. Consider a widely known practice of tax collection 
agencies. By selectively pursuing and investing in the prosecution of one or two high visibility 
cases of tax evasion out of thousands of potential cases, the agency intends to enhance the 
effectiveness of rules and regulations (pre factum) rather than seek justice (post factum). 
This situation is at the center of what we term the “promises of accountability problem.”7 
What has taken place as a result of this decoupling from and subordination of post-factum 
accountability is that the pre-factum mechanisms associated with accountability have emerged as 
tools that promise to deliver accountable behavior—and thus to directly solve—the problems 
of control, legitimacy, and performance. Want greater efficiency? Use reporting and similar 
mechanisms to control the production process. Seek to reduce the democratic deficiencies of an 
agency? Require greater transparency. Wish to improve the outcomes of agency efforts? Impose 
7  For an elaboration of the promises perspective, see Dubnick and Frederickson (2011).
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a system of performance measurement. These are 
the promises of accountability—or, to be more 
precise, the promises of pre-factum accountability.
Solving the problems of efficient control, 
democratic legitimacy, and effective performance 
are without doubt worthy aspirations, and efforts 
to do so ought to be encouraged.  And there is 
little doubt as well that accountability has and 
can play an important role in doing so. But what 
we have learned over the past decades of intense 
accountability-based reform is that the relationship 
between pre-factum account-giving mechanisms 
and each of those objectives is neither simple nor 
easily implemented. 
In the following sections we provide a brief overview 
of the three problems and how they have been 
addressed in the past.  We also consider how the promises of pre-factum accountability emerged 
in each area. This is followed by a more intensive examination of how promise of performance has 
become so prominent, and then we turn our attention to how all this relates to the emergence of the 
Extended State. 
The Problem of Control
In the traditional practice of public administration it is understood that specialization, merit 
appointment, coordination, hierarchy, standardized procedures, record keeping, accounting, policy 
directives, and the other elements of bureaucratic control result in both individual and group 
accountability to agency and program goals. This is the bureaucratic model of accountability, the 
form of accountability with which we are all familiar. Indeed everyone who is part of a public 
agency or private company is part of bureaucracy, kept accountable by the policies and procedures 
of organization. Despite the empirical challenges to this logic on the part of those describing 
This situation is at the center of what 
we term the “promises of accountability 
problem.”  What has taken place as 
a result of this decoupling from and 
subordination of post-factum accountability 
is that the pre-factum  
mechanisms associated with accountability 
have emerged as tools that promise to 
deliver accountable behavior—and thus 
to directly solve—the problems of control, 
legitimacy, and performance. Want greater 
efficiency? Use reporting and similar 
mechanisms to control the production 
process. Seek to reduce the democratic 
deficiencies of an agency? Require 
greater transparency. Wish to improve 
the outcomes of agency efforts? Impose 
a system of performance measurement. 
These are the promises of accountability—
or, to be more precise, the promises of pre-
factum accountability.
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organizational goal displacement, agency capture, and other bureau pathologies, it is certainly the 
case that the dominant bureaucratic form of accountability in governance was—and continues 
to be—the preferred means for asserting and maintaining control over the human factor in the 
machinery of government.
It is notable that what we typically term the “Weberian” bureaucratic model of accountability 
was not the design of sociologist Max Weber, but rather his articulation of an “ideal type” he 
saw emerging during the modern era. Each part of the model—including its explicit and implied 
accountability mechanisms—developed in response to some real or perceived threat to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the increasingly important modern organization. For example, 
the stress on meritorious appointments and promotions was meant to guard against threat to 
efficiency posed by patronage related to corruption. Similarly, the depersonalization of roles 
and hierarchical arrangements of positions was developed in response to the threats posed by 
undisciplined and rogue behavior by the organization’s members. In short, these features and the 
accountability arrangements they generated (e.g., job descriptions, written records) were pre-
factum responses designed to preclude the need for post-factum actions  
(e.g., sanctions, firings).
The dark side of these pre-factum arrangements has not gone unnoticed, especially as they 
related to efforts to enclose workers within what Weber called the “iron cage” of bureaucratic 
rationality. Franz Kafka, a German novelist, wrote so effectively of the dehumanizing  
implications of a bureaucratized life that we often use the term kafkaesque to describe that 
condition. More recently, public administration scholars, such as Ralph Hummel (2008), Guy 
B.  Adams and Danny Balfour (2004), and others, have stressed that dark view. On the larger 
stage of modern philosophy, Hannah Arendt (1976) wrote critically of the banality of evil and 
thoughtlessness generated by bureaucratic orders, and Michel Foucault (1991) spoke of the cold 
and calculating “governmentality” of contemporary governance.
Despite these criticisms, pre-factum bureaucratic accountability arrangements have proven 
so effective that their connection to the post-factum forms was soon lost. Instead, the order, 
predictability, and reliability of government derived from bureaucratic accountability were 
associated with a much simpler logic based on a general sense that these account-giving 
14
mechanisms by themselves hold the promise of 
control. It was a logic not unlike that of the classic 
Pavlovian stimulus-response: impose before-the-
fact forms of accountability and the result will be 
compliant behavior and control over the human 
factor in the organization’s operations.  And it 
is through such control that the objectives of 
efficiency and rationality will be attained.
In one of its most popular and positive forms, this 
promise-based pre-factum approach is found in widely accepted motivational theories, such as 
Douglas McGregor’s Theory X/Theory Y (McGregor 1960). It is a matter of selecting the right 
motivational tools once you’ve established whether you are dealing with lazy Xs or self-actualizing 
Ys. Activate the right tool (typically one related to account giving) and responsiveness to the 
needs of the organization will follow.
Of course, while the promise of control through pre-factum accountability is a popular one, 
the reality is that few organizations have dropped the traditional mechanisms (that is, those 
linked to post-factum functions) entirely.  We all know of the instances when the promises of 
organizational and managerial control through pre-factum accountability fail or prove insufficient. 
In those instances the subject changes from the routines and protocols of before-the-fact 
accountability to the processes of traditional post-factum accountability.  An agency that seeks to 
foster innovation or greater productivity through a pulling back of burdensome oversight and red 
tape (e.g., the expansion of telework arrangements for public employees) is not likely to do so 
without providing at least subtle reminders that there are obligations and legal parameters tied 
to increased discretion over one’s activities.  An organization where experiments with pre-factum 
schemes have resulted in lower productivity or other negative results may drop them altogether 
and return to accountability approaches that explicitly reconnect behavior to demands for post-
factum account giving.
We can see another dimension of the promise of control at work in the use of accountability to 
promote ethical choices and appropriate behavior among agency workers.  Accountability as a 
Pre-factum bureaucratic accountability 
arrangements have proven so effective 
that their connection to the post-
factum forms was soon lost. Instead, 
the order, predictability, and reliability of 
government derived from bureaucratic 
accountability were associated with 
a much simpler logic based on a 
general sense that these account-giving 
mechanisms by themselves hold the 
promise of control.
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word and a concept increasingly implies the promise of ethical behavior of public officials, or at 
least a reduction in corrupt behavior, ordinarily through a variety of procedural mechanisms, such 
as reporting and disclosure requirements for elected and appointed public officials.
Traditionally, professional and jurisdictional codes of ethics and oaths of office were intended to 
encourage ethical behavior by implying that consequences will follow (post factum) violations 
of those standards. Similarly, it could be argued that the almost universal adoption of merit-
based civil service systems by American governments at all levels during the Progressive Era was 
an accountability reform linked to the desire for ethical (that is, less corrupt) behavior in the 
appointment of competent personnel to operate government agencies.  Accountability in the 
Progressive Era was understood to be based on a broad consensus that merit systems would do 
more than bring competence and expertise to government—it would also reduce corruption 
on the part of public officials and thereby make government more honest and therefore more 
accountable to the public (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004).
In the last several decades, things have changed as the impetus to use the logic of a merit-based 
civil service to reduce corruption has weakened. Merit-based selection and promotion of civil 
servants has, in many jurisdictions, and particularly the federal government, been watered down 
as new layers of politically appointed officials have been inserted above (and in lieu of) the merit-
based civil service. What was once associated with often blatant examples of cronyism and 
corruption has now been rationalized as a necessary means for enhancing executive authority and 
responsibility.  This too has been based on a form of the promise of control through accountability, 
defining accountability as the claim of responsiveness to political principles and the agenda of 
particularly elected executives (president, governors, and mayors). Under the promise of control, 
such a claim of responsiveness is sufficient; demand a pledge of responsiveness and control will 
follow.  The erosion of the civil service based on this promise-based pre-factum logic—in addition 
to the widespread practice of contracting out—have almost certainly weakened the role of post-
factum accountability through bureaucratic control (Aberbach and Rockman 2000).
Of the three promises of accountability, the promise of organization and managerial control 
has the strongest historical claim. Despite complaints about “the bureaucracy,” the evidence is 
that public organizations do what their enabling legislation calls for them to do, given the limits 
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of time and money (Wilson 1989). Furthermore, 
public agencies are seldom “out of control,” 
generally responding to the preferences of elected 
officials (West 1995). In short, public agencies are, 
generally speaking, accountable to the law and to 
their political leaders. This is particularly the case 
when accountability is understood to be systems 
of rules and policies, organizational arrangements, 
and managerial leadership that cause or result in 
accountability before the fact. The problem, in many cases, is not the absence of pre-factum 
bureaucratic accountability to public purposes; the problem is the assumption that any or all 
forms of pre-factum accountability are sufficient by themselves to result in appropriate and 
optimum levels of control.
Consider the story behind “red tape.” By definition (Bozeman 1993), red tape represents those 
burdensome “rules, regulations and procedures” that remain in effect despite the fact that they 
“have no efficacy for the rules’ functional object” (1993, 283).  Whatever their original rationale 
or purpose, they stand as useless—and often dysfunctional—legacies to past organizational 
requirements or needs generated for the sake of control.  A past case of fraud or embezzlement 
might result in a new procedure or rule (a pre-factum mechanism) designed to preclude the 
reoccurrence of the episode. While such a reoccurrence proves increasingly unlikely due 
to changes in circumstances, the pre-factum mechanism remains in place, having become 
institutionalized and perhaps now supported by a belief that its maintenance remains critical to 
the management-control system that had developed in and around that rule over time.
This was understood clearly by 16 former senior government executives holding the rank of 
assistant secretary, serving as a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration, who 
issued a report making this point:
Over many years, government has become entwined in elaborate management control 
systems and the accretion of progressively more detailed administrative procedures. 
This development has not produced superior management. Instead, it has produced 
managerial overburden. . . . Procedures overwhelm substance. Organizations become 
The promise of organization and 
managerial control has the strongest 
historical claim. Despite complaints 
about “the bureaucracy,” the evidence is 
that public organizations do what their 
enabling legislation calls for them to 
do, given the limits of time and money.  
Furthermore, public agencies are 
seldom “out of control.”
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discredited, along with their employees. . . . The critical elements of leadership in 
management appear to wither in the face of a preoccupation with process.  The tools are 
endlessly “perfected”; the manager who is expected to use these tools believes himself 
to be ignored. . . . Management systems are not management. . . . The attitude of those 
who design and administer the rules . . . must be reoriented from a “control mentality” 
to one of “how can I help get the mission of this agency accomplished” (NAPA 1983).
Upon coming to the same point, the astute James Colvord, a long-time senior civil servant, 
said that the government needs to have “a bias toward action, small staffs, and a high level of 
delegation which is based on trust” (Wilson 1989, 369).  Although not always in the name of 
accountability, repeated cycles of organizational and managerial reform or, particularly in the 
federal government, have lessened the likelihood of effective accountability. Describing this 
paradox, James Q. Wilson suggests that “to do better we have to deregulate the government” in 
the same way we deregulate the private sector (Wilson 1989, 369). In order to make government 
agencies more accountable, we need to clear the underbrush of red tape created by earlier 
iterations of accountability means and mechanisms that had lost their functionality.
What would a deregulated bureaucracy have looked like (DiIulio 1994)? Under one scenario, left 
to its own devices a deregulated administrative state might have developed into some nightmarish 
vision of power-abusing public officials, wielding their unchecked authority to fulfill or enhance 
their own self-interests. Under a more likely scenario, dedicated public servants, ever mindful of 
the need for democratic legitimacy and demands for performance, would use their managerial 
and organizational skills and authority to dispose of unjustifiable red tape while reshaping the pre-
factum accountability environment.
A third scenario, of course, was to abandon the direct provision of public goods and services 
through various forms of outsourcing—a path that will (and has) subverted the Administrative 
State and put in its place the Extended State. Short of the complete withdrawal of government 
from involvement through a radical form of privatization, this approach must still rely on 
accountability mechanisms to ensure that those operating on behalf of the State are doing so in a 
way that meets the three objectives of control, legitimacy, and performance. 
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The Problem of democratic Legitimacy
The relationship between accountability and democracy is widely accepted, to the point 
that we commonly equate democracy with accountable governance—and vice versa.8 In that 
sense, accountability does promise democratic government, particularly as it establishes the 
answerability and responsiveness of public officials and a set of effective procedural guarantees.
Nothing is more fundamental to representative democratic government than is political 
accountability to citizens. Constitutionally established principles, such as regular and fair elections, 
the rule of law, majority rule, and guaranteed minority rights, are designed to achieve democratic 
accountability. In theory, elected officials are held accountable each election day, and electoral 
mechanisms are more often than not perceived as the perfect set of accountability mechanisms 
within our pre/post-factum framework.  Assuming an incumbent is running, the election itself is 
an opportunity to hold that individual (or party) to account.  Where there is no incumbent, the 
election can be perceived as reflecting a number of messages, from judging the campaign promises 
made to a mandate—or even a warning—from the electorate.  The very existence of an election 
acts on the pre-factum side of the approach, making the officeholder or potential candidate 
behave in ways that can be regarded as responsive or accountable to the wishes of the electorate 
that she or he will face. The problem with this set of mechanisms, of course, is that electoral 
accountability processes are intermittent and distinctly rigged in favor of incumbents,9 which 
considerably weakens their capacity to really enhance democratic accountability. 
Other electoral forms, particularly initiative, referendum, and recall, are likewise understood to 
be means by which the people can directly circumvent representative government and either 
directly legislate or remove officials from office. Finally, the U.S. Constitution as well as the 50 
state constitutions, and particularly the Bill of Rights, include firmly established norms to which 
public officials—both elected and administrative—are to be held accountable (Rosenbloom 1983; 
Rohr 1986).
8  For a recent example, see Fukuyama (2011).
9  Recent studies include Stonecash (2008) and Stone et al. (2010).
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The evidence indicates that American citizens have 
a generalized dissatisfaction with government, 
including feelings of exclusion and powerlessness 
(Mathews 1999; Harwood and Creighton 2008). 
It was Richard Harwood who provided evidence 
that Americans are not apathetic but are mad “at 
a political system that pushed them out of their 
rightful place of governing the nation” (Mathews 
1999, 11). Coming in for the strongest criticism in 
the Harwood study was government controlled by 
a political class, by lobbyists, by powerful interest 
groups, by too much money, by a biased and negative 
media, and by costly and retrograde electoral campaigns. In sum, many citizens do not believe that 
government is accountable to them. Citizens want both good government and good politics.
From an accountability perspective, the modern American concept of politics is too narrow. 
The politics of elections and law and budget making are necessary, but they are not sufficient to 
create or sustain an accountable democratic government.  A wider politics is typically required, 
including the politics of public deliberation; the politics of public engagement in neighborhoods, 
schools, civic clubs, and organizations; and the politics of reframing the political agenda are widely 
practiced but less well understood than electoral politics. There is both a growing awareness of the 
emergence of this wider understanding of politics, as well as a growing literature that describes it.  
This understanding of politics comes in several forms. Perhaps best known are the communitarians 
“back to basics” movement that emphasizes families, schooling, and communities and calls for a 
louder moral voice.  That voice calls for citizens taking responsibility as an alternative to claiming 
rights (Etzioni 1993; Schorr 1997).  Another variant in the wider understanding of politics is the 
social capital perspective associated with Robert D. Putnam and the work of the Saguaro Seminars. 
Putnam describes the decline of community-based intermediate institutions as well as a decline 
in political participation. He and many others call for a reemergent agenda for social capitalists—
citizens trained and organized to be politically engaged (Putnam 2000).  A third variant in the wider 
understanding of politics is the citizenship and civic-engagement advocates (Skocpol 2003; Skocpol 
and Fiorina 1999; Schudson 1998; Mathews 1999). Perhaps most notable in this variant is the work 
From an accountability perspective, the 
modern American concept of politics is 
too narrow.  The politics of elections and 
law and budget making are necessary, but 
they are not sufficient to create or sustain 
an accountable democratic government.  A 
wider politics is typically required, including 
the politics of public deliberation; the politics 
of public engagement in neighborhoods, 
schools, civic clubs, and organizations; 
and the politics of reframing the political 
agenda are widely practiced but less well 
understood than electoral politics.
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of National Issues Forums, a national network of locally based groups and organizations engaged in 
deliberation on the most vexing policy issues of the day.
There are far more similarities than there are differences between these approaches to a wider 
understanding of politics.  All are local or grass roots.  All are deliberative.  All assume the 
legitimacy of direct forms of citizen engagement, which is to say that American government is not 
the sole province of elected legislators and executives.  All assume that the key to an engaged 
public is to be found in a well-informed electorate and that deliberation is the key to informing 
the public (Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003). David Mathews makes this incisive point: 
On reflection, it seems to us that the accountability movement is powerful because it 
serves its own kind of politics, which is as entrenched as the movement. If that is so, 
nothing will change until there is some reconsideration of the dominant mode of politics. 
While the accountability movement would likely claim to be serving democracy, we 
would like to know what kind of democracy; specifically, we would like to know what 
concept of citizenship is implied in accountability practices. Our system tends to sideline 
citizens as occasional voters and consumers of political fare but not recognizing them as 
people capable of producing public goods by their collective efforts. So, if the prevailing 
concept of who citizens are (or should be) is the central issue, we reason, any corrective 
has to begin there. 
More and more, we suspect that there are significant differences in the way citizens 
understand accountability and the way officeholders and institutional officials 
(governmental and nongovernmental) understand it.  We don’t think one understanding 
is necessarily better than another but that the differences may be responsible for much 
of the frustration of both institutional leaders and “the people.” A very tentative hypothesis 
is that institutions think of accountability primarily in informational terms while citizens think of 
it more in relational terms (Mathews 2011, ix).
This wider understanding of politics includes the direct voices of the public in all their diversity.  
These voices call for direct accountability to the people on the part of those whom they have 
elected, and this accountability is far more than merely being elected or reelected.
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Rather than the accountability of elected officials to the people, a second form of political 
accountability involves those to whom the daily work of government has been delegated by 
the policies and decisions of elected principals—that is, public administration. Earlier in this 
monograph we described accountability patterns found in the organization and management 
of government, and we claimed that these patterns evidenced a generalized pre-factum 
accountability committed to the objective of providing efficient and orderly governance. Here 
we stress the second objective—a commitment to democracy, to the law, to elected officials, 
and to the public. Depending on the level of government and on the policy field, there are 
wide variations in the effectiveness of government programs, variations based on the intrinsic 
tractability of the policy challenge ranging from the operation of Social Security to the operation 
of schools or prisons.  Accountable public administration turns on policy tractability, the 
availability of resources, and goal clarity. But it also turns on the legitimacy of its processes in the 
eyes of those who put their trust in government agents and agences.  
The large and growing outsourcing of the day-to-day implementation of public policy is a 
fundamental challenge to the accountability of public agencies in their efforts to achieve and 
sustain democratic legitimacy. It is unlikely that so-called third party government or the hollow 
state (what we discuss below as the Extended State) can be rendered as accountable either 
to elected officials, to the public, or to the law as in traditional public-sector agencies. The 
delegation of authority through contracts or grants may include provisions that can simulate 
superficial forms of legitimate behavior, but democratic legitimacy is not easily passed on to 
third parties or grantees, even if they are themselves subject to legitimacy pressures (e.g., in 
the United States, states that act as agents of federal requirements in their implementation of 
federally funded programs).
The problem posed by the Extended State is a magnified version of the issues facing any form of 
authority delegation in the public sector. Viewing the problem of delegation of authority in the 
more general context of the European regulatory state, Giandomenico Majone concludes, “it is up 
to the political principals [elected officials] to structure relationships with their agents [regulatory 
agencies] so that the outcomes of the agents’ efforts comply with democratic accountability, given 
the choice to delegate in the first place” (Majone 1999, 13).  The extension of state functions to 
third parties and grantees was regarded, in the not too distant past, as a fundamental violation 
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of basic constitutional principles in the United States, but over time practice has overtaken 
principle and it is now unchallenged if not formally justifiable (see Lowi 1969).  Applying pre-
factum accountability mechanisms, such as those suggested by Majone to address complaints of  
“democratic deficits,” can help, but only if linked to post-factum consequences.  Too often, however, 
there is little or no such linkage. Merely requiring transparency10 and other superficial mechanisms 
of account giving will not suffice, a point Majone makes when he points out that “in the final 
analysis” their legitimacy “depends on their capacity to engender and maintain the belief that they 
are the most appropriate ones for the functions entrusted to them” (Majone 1999, 22).
Problems of Performance Measurement as Accountability
The third problem accountability can address—effective performance—is achievable through 
assessments of performance and the application of performance standards. This is the common 
mantra among most modern administrative reformers (Radin 2006). Accountability through 
performance measurement, performance management, and performance budgeting is the fashion 
of the day, a hegemony seldom subject to question. The assumed linkage between accountability 
and performance is so powerful, in fact, that the two are used as indicators of each other: to be 
accountable is to live up to expected performance and to be performing up to (or in excess of) 
standards is a clear sign of being accountable.
The role of performance measures was initially applied to problems of managerial control. 
The idea of using performance assessments and measurement as the basis for improving the 
management and delivery of public services is traceable at least to the Progressive Era, and 
especially to the work of municipal research bureaus (Williams 2003) and related organizations. 
The emphasis at that time was on gathering a wide range of data that would be used as social 
indicators of existing conditions and applied in early forms of “needs assessment” that would 
guide choices of emerging social service agencies and charities. For those concerned with the 
corruption and inefficiencies of government, those indicators became the basis for advocating 
civil service and general administrative reforms, leading to more specific measures of agency and 
program performance. Measures of outcomes were a logical next step since the same numbers 
10  On transparency as a governance mechanism, see Hood and Heald (2006); Fung, Graham, and Weil (2007); also 
Piotrowski (2007).
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could be employed to assess the success of specific programs (e.g., the performance of a sewer 
system is measured by changes in the mortality rates over time). 
What Williams (2003) uncovers in his detailed exploration is that those early efforts were driven 
by mixed motives, reflected in the three types of measurement that emerged at the time: needs 
assessment, outcome measurement, and productivity measurement. Needs assessment was 
somewhat relevant to performance in providing information on current conditions that could 
be used as a basis for later assessments. Productivity measures served the needs of those who 
wanted to uncover corruption and inefficiencies that can be subjected to the wide range of 
progressive reforms. Outcome measures of performance were of secondary importance in those 
early years, but played a role nonetheless in bringing about reforms. The roots of performance 
measurement, in short, are found in the general commitment of Progressive Era reformers to 
understand and deal with the major social and political problems of their day.
As the energy of the progressive reform movement dissipated, the further development of 
performance measures and monitoring systems shifted to the private sector where scientific 
management approaches and its progeny were flourishing. The technical advances made 
in performance measurement were generally aimed at enhancing productivity rather than 
outcomes—and any concern with the performance of individuals was typically related back to 
questions of how to improve overall cooperation in the drive for greater productivity.
Performance measurement reemerged in the public sector during the 1960s as part of systems 
thinking and evaluation research,11 but here again there is little explicit connection to issues of 
accountability, especially at the individual level. Management-by-objectives (MBO)—promulgated 
as an idea by Peter Drucker (1954)12 and eventually endorsed (albeit briefly) by the Nixon 
administration13—provided the connection, however, with its basic assumption that employees 
who played a role in setting the goals and objectives of the organization would be both motivated 
and willing to be held to account for their achievement. By 1980, in both the United States 
and the United Kingdom, performance measurement had come into its own as a major tool 
11  See the classic (and quite devastating) critique of the systems approach in Hoos (1972); also Hoos (1973).
12  Drucker (1976) points out that MBO has deeper roots than his own articulation in the 1950s.
13  The Nixon administration adopted MBO in 1973, but by 1976 it was essentially regarded as a failure (see 
Sherwood and Page 1976; Newland 1976; Rose 1977); however, in 1995 Poister and Streib reported that it was alive and 
well in a number of surveyed municipalities.
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of governance in the Administrative State, and it played an even more significant role in other 
nations (e.g., New Zealand, Canada) as the NPM movement spread.
Assessments and critiques of performance measurement and its associated management 
technologies are easy to find, and it would be absurd to offer a comprehensive overview of the 
various comments and observations. But from our perspective, there have been two significant 
and related developments. First and foremost, performance measurement increasingly became a 
management tool reflecting a belief14 in what we term accountability’s “promise of performance” 
(also see Ammons 2002)—an unsubstantiated and articulated assumption that the pre-factum 
imposition of performance standards and goals is sufficient to produce demanded or appropriate 
outcomes through accountable behavior on the part of an organization and its members. This ran 
counter to all forms of performance-management approaches that preceded the promise, even 
MBO which required participation and commitment in the setting of objectives by those who 
would be held to account.
Second, and perhaps most important, accountability’s promise of performance has become 
politicized to the point of putting major decisions about the design and implementation of 
performance-based management into the hands of politically driven policymakers who use the call 
for greater accountability (i.e., greater performance) as a means of mobilizing electoral support. 
There is perhaps no better example than the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), originally 
passed in 2002 and up for renewal at the time of this writing.  Although this high-stakes form of 
education policy might, in some earlier iteration, have been based on a well thought through logic 
tied to a substantial theory of how to enhance student performance, such a theory—other than 
the promise of performance—has been lacking since passage of the act.
NCLB also stands in as well as an example of the accountability challenges posed by the Extended 
State.  While the U.S. government lacks explicit constitutional authority to set policies for K-12 
education in states and localities, there is little doubt that both Republican and Democratic 
administrations in Washington have education as a high priority. In addition, NCLB stands out as 
an example of a policy born of enthusiastic bipartisan support in Congress as well.  And yet it is 
14  Kelly (2002) notes that there is little actual evidence or facts to support that belief, so we most take it “on 
faith.”
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a policy that requires that federal administrators make use of nonfederal parties to carry out its 
program objectives. How does the U.S. Department of Education go about ensuring accountable 
managerial control, democratic legitimacy, and effective performance in the implementation of 
its programs? And how does it do so without relying (as it does now) on simplistic assumptions 
about the relationship between accountability and performance? These are issues to which we 
will return later in this monograph.
Although NCLB represents the most visible and, at present, the most controversial of efforts to 
fulfill accountability’s promise of performance, perhaps the most significant reform in this regard 
is found in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and its progeny: the 
Bush administration Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) and the GPRA Modernization Act 
(GPRAMA).
The text of the 1993 GPRA legislation identifies its purposes as improving the following: the 
public’s confidence in government, program effectiveness, customer service, accountability, service 
delivery, congressional decision making, and the internal management of the federal government. 
It seeks to address the perceived inefficiency and ineffectiveness of federal agencies, which it 
attributes to poorly defined agency missions, goals, and objectives and to inadequate performance 
information. Not only do these conditions breed poor performance, advocates for GPRA passage 
claimed, they also lead to the public’s low confidence in government and hamper congressional 
decision making.
As a remedy for inefficiency and ineffectiveness, GPRA required that federal agencies: (1) establish 
strategic plans that provide broad descriptions of agency goals and objectives covering a period of 
three to five years; and (2) develop annual performance plans on the basis of measures, preferably 
quantified, by which agencies determine the extent to which goals and objectives are being met 
and report annually on agency performance based on these measures.15
Put in perspective of the three problems discussed above, GPRA can be regarded as a 
congressional mandate for federal agencies to shift their focus from organizational and managerial 
15  For perspectives on the 1993 act as it was being implemented, see Kravchuck & Schack (1996) and Radin 
(1998).
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control to performance. GAO, in its 1996 “Executive Guide” for implementing GPRA, stated the 
implications of the act clearly, noting:  
Every major federal agency must now ask itself some basic questions:  What is our 
mission? What are our goals and how will we achieve them? How can we measure our 
performance? How will we use that information to make improvements? GPRA forces a 
shift in the focus of federal agencies—away from such traditional concerns as staffing and 
activity levels and toward a single overriding issue: results. GPRA requires agencies to set 
goals, measure performance, and report on their accomplishments. This will not be easy.  
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1996, 1)
Although GPRA was still relatively new and not yet fully implemented when the Bush 
administration took office, in the early stages of the Bush presidency a rather different approach 
to performance measurement was developed through implementation guidance in the form of a 
PART developed by the Office of Management and Budget (see Gilmour 2007).16 At the direction 
of the White House, OMB assembled a team to reform or augment GPRA, and in July 2002, OMB 
introduced PART, a large questionnaire designed to be answered by agencies. PART included 25 to 
30 questions grouped into the following four categories: program purpose and design; strategic 
planning; program management; and program results/accountability.  The first question in each 
category was as follows: 
• Is the program purpose clear? 
• Does the program have a limited number of specific long-range performance measures that 
focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program? 
• Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including 
information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve 
performance? 
• Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance 
goals? 
On the basis of agency answers to these and other questions, OMB assigns either a yes/no 
response or a response of yes/large extent/small extent/no response. Each answer is to be 
accompanied by an explanation.
16  Also see Gilmour & Lewis (2006) and Breul (2007) for more on the Bush administration’s effort to assert 
managerial control.
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The relationship between GPRA and PART proved to be problematic (GAO 2005).  While GPRA 
reflected accountability’s promise of performance, PART was clearly focused on the use of pre-
factum mechanisms to deal with the problem of managerial (i.e., White House) control. The 
GPRA statute provides a framework under which agencies prepare strategic plans, performance 
plans (now, performance budgets), and performance reports that set goals and annual targets for 
those goals and report on the extent to which they are achieved. PART was a systemic method 
of assessing performance of program activities from the perspective of the White House, focusing 
on their contribution to an agency’s achievement of the administration’s strategic and program 
performance goals as expressed in the president’s budget.
On the basis of agency responses to the PART questionnaire, OMB assigned a score to each 
question and an aggregate score for each program assessed through PART.   The aggregate 
score was based on the application of different weights to each of PART’s four sections, with 
the greatest weight placed on the program’s performance results.  After assembling the results 
of agency responses to the PART questionnaire, OMB assigns a rating, based primarily on the 
score, to each program. Programs can be rated “effective,” “moderately effective,” “adequate,” 
“ineffective,” or “results not demonstrated.” The PART responses and ratings are published in 
the subsequent year’s submission of the president’s budget. For example, PART assessments 
conducted in 2004 were published the following January with the release of the president’s fiscal 
year 2006 budget. In the original version of PART the summed scores assigned to each program 
or agency were described as “the percent accountable.”
PART was not continued by the Barack Obama administration, and in its place the White House 
undertook an Accountable Government Initiative (White House 2010) that focused almost 
exclusively on issues related to problems of managerial control.
As part of its Accountable Government Initiative, the Administration has moved to cut 
programs that don’t work and other wasteful spending, streamline what does work, 
modernize how government operates to save money and improve performance, and 
make government more open and responsive to the needs of the American people.
That initiative was part of a more general White House call for “High-Performance Government,” 
and it followed the guidance OMB gave to agencies in June 2009 for developing the FY2011 
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budget. In that guidance, the Obama’s OMB had effectively abandoned the PART approach and its 
“performance rating” approach by deferring to individual agency priorities. In a memo, then OMB 
director Peter R. Orszag “asked agency heads to identify a limited number of high-priority goals 
and begin developing strategies to address them.” Commenting on this move,  John Kamensky 
called it “unusual,” but “praised Orszag for learning from past administrations that agencies, not 
the White House or OMB, should set priorities” (Newell 2009).
This was followed by a potentially even more significant development. During its lame duck 
session in late 2010, Congress passed the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2011 that 
amended the original GPRA to address some of the tensions that had developed as a result 
of conflicts between the congressional push for performance and the White House need 
for mechanisms that gave it greater managerial control. In the GAO’s assessment of the new 
legislation (Dodaro 2011), it highlighted provisions that would result in
• a more coordinated and cross-cutting approach to achieving meaningful results, 
• efforts to address weaknesses in major management functions, 
• ensuring performance information is both useful and used in decision making, 
• sustained leadership commitment and accountability for achieving results, and 
• engaging Congress in identifying management and performance issues to address.
Despite all the qualifications and adjustments that 
have occurred over the past 18 years, what the 
history of GPRA, PART, and GPRAMA represents 
is the elevation of accountability’s promise of 
performance to the driving force behind the 
American approach to governance. Performance 
measurement, in short, has become central to 
the institutional infrastructure of government 
operations. In the pantheon of various efforts at 
measurement or assessment-based reforms, from cost-benefit analysis to PPBS and MBO to ZBB, 
performance measurement has been among the most durable, primarily (we believe) because it is 
linked to accountability’s promise of performance. The question is whether the institutionalization 
of the promise of performance is a positive development, or an obstacle to effective governance.
With the accountability-based promise of performance playing such an important role in the 
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administration of federal programs, the question necessarily arises as to whether such an 
approach is indeed effective in improving the performance of government agencies and agents. 
What is most inviting about accountability’s promise of performance is that it makes logical and 
conventional sense to those who operate in a world reflecting the characteristics of an ideal-type 
Weberian bureaucracy operating within the confines of the modern Administrative State. The 
problem is that the reality of today’s governance is far removed from those conditions.
Some Issues Surrounding Accountability’s Promise of Performance 
Accountability, it is argued, often comes with an accountability paradox. Beryl Radin (2006) claims 
that there is an inherent tension between accountability and performance, and efforts to improve 
the performance of public agencies through accountability mechanisms tend to have the opposite 
effect. In the accountability paradox, agencies are held to account for how well they implement 
formal accountability processes and paperwork procedures rather than for how well they actually 
perform their primary purposes.  The accountability paradox argument also points to high 
transaction costs: expenses of time and resources devoted to account giving are resources that 
could have been used to improve performance (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006). 
A more important challenge to the presumed connection between greater accountability and 
enhanced performance comes from Jennifer Lerner and Philip E. Tetlock. Their review of research 
findings regarding how individuals react to account-giving situations is sobering and worth quoting: 
This review underscored the falsity of the conventional wisdom—often born of 
frustration at irrational, insensitive, or lazy decision makers—that accountability is 
a cognitive or social panacea:  ‘All we have to do is hold the rascals accountable.’ 
Two decades of research now reveals that (a) only highly specialized subtypes of 
accountability lead to increased cognitive effort; (b) most cognitive effort is not 
inherently beneficial; it sometimes makes matters worse; (c) there is ambiguity and 
room for reasonable disagreement over what should be considered worse or better 
judgment when we place cognition in an institutional context. In short, accountability is 
a logically complex construct that interacts with characteristics of decision makers and 
properties of the task environment to produce an array of effects—only some of which 
are beneficial (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). 
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This is high academic jargon for Lerner and Tetlock’s basic claim—greater accountability seldom 
results in improved organizational performance. Systems of accountability are essential to the 
effective oversight of public administration. So are systems of performance measurement and 
evaluation. But they are not the same thing.  The assumed relationship between accountability and 
performance may be conventional wisdom, but it is an untested assertion.  We already know from 
the Hawthorne studies that attention and trust induce performance improvement. Can the same 
be said for accountability systems based on performance measurement (Dubnick 2005)? 
There is little question that the potential of thoughtful and well-crafted performance-measurement-
based accountability principles can contribute to the quality of governance and, thereby, to 
improvement of prospects that the public sector can achieve its purposes. Instead, we attempt here to 
answer this question: How can performance measurement be better understood as accountability? 
There is a considerable body of useful accountability research and theory. Performance 
measurement has become shorthand for precision and objectivity in the definitions of goals 
and purposes. Precise quantitative measures, so called metrics, are the means by which levels 
of goal achievement can be determined. In this evaluation, the emphasis is on the application of 
modern accountability principles in the public rather than the corporate world because, as Harry 
Boyte puts it, “public work” is a world of changing values, ambiguous purposes, and elevated 
expectations (Boyte and Kari 1996). 
Table 2 is a simplified template of the theory and practice of performance measurement as 
a primary means of accountability.  To describe the contemporary use of performance-based 
accountability claims, we employ a “theory versus practice” heuristic to aid in the discussion of 
the effectiveness of performance measurement as accountability.  The rhetoric and theoretical 
premises of performance measurement as accountability are set out in the center column of  
Table 2.  The actual practices of performance measurement as accountability are set out in the 
right-hand column. Put another way, the center column lists the theoretical claims of performance 
measurement as accountability, the right-hand column lists the evidence.17
17  Table 2 synthesizes and summarizes an extensive literature on performance measurement. That literature can 
be roughly divided into: (a) performance measurement promotion and advocacy using some case-study example and (b) 
empirically based critiques of performance measurement (Ingraham 2007; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Radin 
2006; Moynihan 2006; Forsythe 2001; Kamensky and Morales 2005; Kearny and Berman 1999; Berman 1998; Hatry 2006). 
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Accountability In Theory In Practice
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V Performance measures show that programs often: perform poorly
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would be worse without 
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VI Policy is influenced by: measures of performance and results
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VII The propensity to innovate is:
a. enhanced by measuring
performance and results
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enhanced by risk taking 
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TABLE 2. Performance Measurement As Accountability in Theory and Practice
In theory, measures of performance are thought to be the factual answers to questions about 
organizational effectiveness. In practice, performance measures are themselves questions, or at least 
they raise as many questions as they answer. Performance measures are exactly that, quantitative 
representations of some reality. Because performance measures are presented quantitatively, they 
may have the appearance of fact and may convey impressions of objectivity and neutrality, but in 
practice such measures are quantitative interpretations of reality in the same way words are narrative 
interpretations of reality. In practice, very little is judged to be neutral and objective; all performance 
measures may be used as arguments and weapons in policy debates. If one supports a program and 
performance measures appear to indicate that the program is doing well, then those performance 
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measures are seen to be objective, factual, and 
neutral determinations of program results. The 
same performance measures will be judged to 
be slanted interpretations of questionable data 
when an individual or a group opposing a policy or 
program views them.
Measures of performance, if based upon reliable 
data and kept up to date, may tell the organization 
in a general way how it is doing.  As guides 
for incremental program adaption, reliable 
performance data are helpful. But such measures 
seldom tell an organization what to do.
It is in the nature of organizations to be advocates, to represent particular values and beliefs. 
Should such organizations not be expected to design strategic plans and attendant performance 
measures so as to demonstrate success? Is it reasonable to imagine, particularly in the short run, 
that organizational executives will indicate that the investment of scarce organizational resources 
is being wasted?
For these and other reasons described below, performance measures are best understood 
as information that may help sharpen questions rather than the answers to questions. 
Such measures, particularly in fields with illusive bottom lines, are best thought of as clues, 
interpretations, impressions, and useful input rather than facts.  And of course all such 
interpretations carry with them certain biases, assumptions, and values. 
It is useful to recall the wisdom of Derek Bok, in his splendid treatment of performance 
measurement in government:
Attempts to measure the effectiveness of American government are necessarily crude. 
In certain cases, to be sure, one can measure the progress of particular programs with 
clearly defined goals and even compare the government’s record with that of private 
firms performing similar tasks. But scattered examples of this kind hardly add up to a 
In practice, performance measures are 
themselves questions, or at least they raise as 
many questions as they answer. Performance 
measures are exactly that, quantitative 
representations of some reality. Because 
performance measures are presented 
quantitatively, they may have the appearance 
of fact and may convey impressions of 
objectivity and neutrality, but in practice such 
measures are quantitative interpretations of 
reality in the same way words are narrative 
interpretations of reality. In practice, very 
little is judged to be neutral and objective; 
all performance measures may be used as 
arguments and weapons in policy debates.
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complete picture of the government’s performance.  And even if the examples could be 
multiplied, there is no way of aggregating the results into a reliable overall measure of 
effectiveness (Bok 2001, 20-21).
If we are to be accountable based on measuring performance, how shall we know what to 
measure? Virtually all the evidence on the public side is to the effect that (1) the measurable 
drives out the important; (2) it is extremely difficult to measure actual results so analysts turn 
to surrogates of results; (3) analysts rely on measures of process rather than actual outcomes. 
Each of these choices has its own rationality. Choosing to measure the measurable rather than 
the important supports a theoretical point made 50 years ago by Herbert Simon. It is rational, he 
claimed, for administrators to use tested techniques, affordable techniques, and techniques that 
are near at hand. Data gathering and analysis is expensive and time consuming, and performance 
measures go rapidly out of date.
In the language of performance measurement the most common surrogate or proxy is a so-called 
output matrix, a measure of organizational production. Performance measurement advocates 
strongly prefer measures of outcomes. 
Surrogates are very useful in performance measurement. For example, we may not agree on 
what constitutes good education because it is next to impossible, particularly in the short term, 
to measure education. But we can require students to take standardized tests, we can evaluate 
teachers, and we can measure overall school performance. All are output, proxy, or surrogate 
measures. So it is with civil investing; we agree that community and citizenship are very important, 
but measuring them is tough. So analysts measure bowling, participation in intermediate 
institutions, and public opinion, and when thoughtfully aggregated these measures give us clues, 
sharpen our questions, and guide incremental adaption of policies and programs (Putnam 2000).
But it is process that is most important of all. Consider justice. Justice is difficult to define. Instead 
procedural due process is established, and the result of that process is called justice. Consider 
democracy. Elaborate electoral processes are put in place and the result is called democracy. 
Over time, reasoned evaluations of justice and democratic processes inform attempts to improve 
them. It is exactly the same in civil society, community development, and citizenship.  The National 
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Civic League’s Civic Index: Measuring Your Community’s Civic Health (1999) is a process measure of 
civil society. Many of the findings based on the Social Capital Benchmark Survey of the Saguaro 
Seminar are process measures. The received wisdom in public policy and administration is that 
it is much easier to find consensus on a process or a course of action than it is to get people to 
agree on objectives, particularly objectives that are more specific than bland generalizations like 
“better education.”
In sum, in the public sector it is both rational and helpful to measure what we can, to measure 
proxies of results, and to measure processes in lieu of outcomes.
Comparative analysis as in the use of benchmarks is a common feature of performance 
management. There are two difficulties associated with using comparative analysis to determine 
how well organizations are performing.  To begin with, estimating a program’s contribution to 
performance is extremely difficult. The effect of law enforcement on crime is one prominent 
example; the independent impact of schools on student achievement is another.  The second 
problem is that conditions vary substantially from one city or community to another, one church 
to another, one university to another. One cannot help but wonder whether variations in the 
amount of progress made in various fields of endeavor are due to the performance of institutions 
or to differences in the external conditions under which individual programs operate. For 
example, if the United States has made less progress than other countries in eradicating poverty, 
reducing pollution, or achieving higher student test scores, it is at least conceivable that our 
record reflects such factors as larger size, greater population diversity, heavier defense burdens 
during the cold war, or the unfortunate legacy of race.
Relatively noncontroversial, unambiguous federal programs, such as the work of the Social Security 
Administration and the Postal Service, lend themselves to performance measurement, and they tend 
to do well. But many government programs have little basis for reasonable comparison. The work of 
diplomacy, national defense, medical research, and justice are not easy to measure against business 
practices. In the absence of a basis for comparison the question changes from how well is national 
defense doing? to how well are we doing national defense? Or the question changes from how well 
are schools doing? to how well are we doing schooling? In the theory of performance measurement 
this may be disappointing. In practice, however, it has its own rationality.
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All of this suggests the frailty of comparison as a useful performance- measurement tool. Despite 
its weaker logic, measuring the performance of a program all by itself and on its own terms 
is likely to yield information at least as useful as comparative analysis. Context matters and 
comparisons should be carefully and cautiously made. 
Despite advances in social science methodology it is still very difficult to demonstrate precise 
causality.  This difficulty is particularly notable in public fields like education, law enforcement, 
or national defense, in which goals are ambiguous or in conflict. Nevertheless, experienced 
observers and participants know the importance of resources to schooling, to law enforcement, 
to medical research, and so forth, although it is often difficult or impossible to precisely measure 
causality. Reason suggests that the same is true in civil society, although descriptions of causality 
are narrative rather than quantitative and it is difficult if not impossible to prove causality.  
Therefore, in a world of unclear or indeterminate causality, we rely on softer social science—
history, participant observation, surveys, interviews, and case studies. When softer social science 
is carefully done, it conveys a form of evidence that may not be causality but is useful evidence 
nevertheless.
It is an axiom of public policy and management that the public sector ends up with the nasty 
problems (Hargrove and Glidewell 1990).  As a consequence, many programs designed to 
ameliorate these problems perform poorly. In the measurement of the results of specific 
programs it is often impossible to know how much would have been achieved had the program 
not existed. Inner-city schools are cases in point. So are jails and prisons and the problems of 
recidivism and rehabilitation. Poor overall performance may have less to do with the effectiveness 
of public and nonprofit programs and more to do with the intractable nature of many social 
problems. It is because of the intractable nature of many social problems that well-meaning 
people and organizations do their best to make things better.  To use performance measures 
to relentlessly remind us that things are bad and don’t appear to be getting much better is 
neither evidence that social programs are failing nor justification for program discontinuation. 
The application of strict accountability logic to organizations dealing with the toughest social 
and public problems may be overly accountable to boards and legislatures and not sufficiently 
accountable to those in need.
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One of the great fallacies in public life is that 
performance measures and similar data are influential 
in policymaking. In rank order of salience, policy is 
moved by changing conditions or circumstances, 
changing values, rhetoric, and winning coalitions. 
Consider the great epochs in American public life—
the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the reform-
progressive movement, the Depression and the New Deal, the civil rights movement—each was 
at some level influenced by information, accurate and inaccurate, but each was really moved by 
critical circumstances, by changing social values, and by political rhetoric. Only then did winning 
coalitions change and thereby change policy.
If those who lead public agencies, believe that changing public policy is their purpose, yet do 
not invest over time in trusted institutions, they run against the wind. But if they do all they can 
through trusted institutions to achieve agency purposes for their own sake, the prospects for 
changed policy are great.  And if the programs of public agencies are only a bit effective, when 
circumstances change—a war, an epidemic, a recession—strengthened and resilient institutions 
will be better able to respond to the challenge (Wildavsky 1988).
All this is not to argue that policy does not matter, because it does. “Broken windows” policy, 
community policing policy, “three strikes and you’re out” policy, and many others are obviously 
important—and controversial. But these policies are moved more by circumstances (or perceived 
circumstances), changing values, and political rhetoric than they are moved by accountability-
driven performance-measurement protocols. 
These days it is fashionable to put together the logic of performance measurement and the 
organizational search for innovation. Management consultants and corporate CEOs are partial 
to the logic that innovation can be managed, which assumes the compatibility of performance 
measurement and innovation. There are three major components to the management of innovation 
logic applied in the private sector: innovation stimulus, the organization’s capacity to innovate, and 
the innovations themselves.18 The general argument is that innovations in either the production 
18  Based on Prajogo and Ahmed (2006).
One of the great fallacies in public 
life is that performance measures 
and similar data are influential in 
policymaking. In rank order of salience, 
policy is moved by changing conditions 
or circumstances, changing values, 
rhetoric, and winning coalitions.
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process or in the product itself will be positively associated with a greater capacity to innovate, 
which in turn can be stimulated by any number of manageable (and managed) factors.  The 
“theory”—carried over to the public sector—is that by strategically integrating the measurement 
of product and production process innovations into the management (i.e., innovation stimulus) 
scheme, both the capacity and motivation to generate further innovation will be enhanced.
On the surface, that logic makes sense given the growing literature on innovation which points to 
positive relationship between an organization’s innovation capacity and real changes (often real 
advances) in products and production processes. But the devil is in the details of the argument. 
In both historical (see Johnson 2010) and empirical studies (Christensen 2000; Collins and Porras 
1994; Light 1998; Nayak and Ketteringham 1994), the nurturing capacity for innovations is found 
to be greatest in loosely managed organizations that provide open, collaborative “spaces” that 
are flexible, loosely coupled, decentralized. Such environments are not conducive to being tightly 
managed or constantly subjected to high-stakes performance pressures (see Prajogo & Ahmed 
2006). Moreover, the kind of innovative and entrepreneurial behavior generated by such overly 
managed, excessively measured environments may not be of the most desirable sort, and in fact 
might prove highly dysfunctional and counterproductive. 
For an example, we return to the case of the high-stakes performance-measurement regime that 
characterizes No Child Left Behind.  The pressure imposed on schools and teachers under NCLB 
is intended to do more than make educators work harder; it is also intended to get them to 
work smarter, and to improve their teaching through the use of new and innovative approaches 
and techniques that make more effective use of their classroom time. Critiques of the testing 
regime used in NCLB’s push for “accountability” abound, and even were we to put aside the 
evidence of outright cheating and lying (Gilliom 2010; also Nichols & Berliner 2005), there remain 
the responses sparked by blame and risk avoidance (Hood 2002), shame and guilt avoidance 
(Posner & Rasmusen 1999) and even (as suggested in Popham 2005) pain avoidance. These various 
emotive reactions to pressures for innovative teaching often motivate individual and collective 
attempts to develop innovative responses with the intent of mitigating the real or potential threat 
of high-stakes assessments.
Diane Ravitch (2010), in her devastating critique of NCLB, offers an overview of the “gaming” 
that the policy has generated (2010, 154-161). She calls “plain old-fashioned cheating” the “most 
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reprehensible form of gaming” (2010, 155), but then highlights a variety of  “not outright illegal” 
approaches fostered by the high-stakes accountability system. Principals have strategies to 
reduce the number of low-performing test-takers, either through control of school admission 
policies, encouraging them to stay home on test day, or by reclassifying them as “special needs” 
students who are not eligible to take the exam. They can also enhance the performance of test-
takers by certifying them as students in need of “accommodation,” thus allowing them access 
to dictionaries or other forms of support during the testing period. Resources devoted to 
test preparation increases significantly under the high-stakes regime, and increasingly time and 
curriculum content are devoted to instruction that clearly fostered a teach-to-the-test approach.  
Assistance also comes from the school district or state education offices where test content is 
determined, as is the determination of what constitutes a “passable” score. In New York State, 
the level of passable performance on various parts of the statewide “Regents Exam” (a score of 
65) was “converted” through scoring that made low percentage scores the equivalent of 65. In 
Cleveland, district policies allowed them to “scrub” from the records the test scores of students 
who were not continuously enrolled during the school year—a practice that boosted the overall 
performance of 4th and 10th graders significantly.
Looked at objectively (and somewhat ironically), the lesson of the NCLB case is that the use of 
performance measures in a high-stakes accountability regime can produce fresh and innovative 
thinking, but not necessarily of the sort that one would have expected. In theory, innovation; in 
practice, gaming.
The assumed positive relationship between performance measurement and innovation implies 
a more fundamental belief that such measures can, if appropriately designed and applied, be 
used to strategically change the organization or program so that it is better able—particularly 
through differentiation—to contend with an otherwise complex environment and uncertain/risky 
future.  A measure of current performance, according to this logic, can highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of an organization, providing at least a clear picture of the two basic ingredients in a 
SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) assessment (see Bryson 2004). Measures 
of performance can also be used comparatively and competitively, providing an agency with a 
means for exploring opportunities and threats. Performance measurement, in short, can be used to 
enhance the capacity of an organization to deal with the risks and uncertainties of its future.
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When Kaplan and Norton initially developed their balanced scorecard approach (BSC) (1992), 
they did so with the idea of offering organizations a framework for supplementing and offsetting 
the typical overreliance on financial measures. In that sense, the BSC focused on the nonfinancial 
measures as indicators of past and present performance, but they had little else in mind.  As they 
noted nearly a decade later, what they discovered was that many organizations adopting the BSC 
framework were using it as part of their strategic-planning process.
Originally, we thought the Balanced Scorecard was about performance measurement…. 
Once organizations developed their basic system for measuring strategy, however, 
we quickly learned that measurement has consequences far beyond reporting on the 
past. Measurement creates focus for the future. The measures chosen by managers 
communicate important messages to all organizational units and employees. To take 
full advantage of this power, companies soon integrated their new measures into a 
management system.  Thus the Balanced Scorecard concept evolved from a performance 
measurement system to become the organizing framework, the operating system, for a 
new strategic management system (Kaplan 2001, 99, 102; emphasis in original).
The theory underlying BSC is that performance measures, when put within a coherent and well-
articulated frame, can create a more effective organization that is capable of dealing with—and 
perhaps shaping—its future circumstances.  The promise of performance is extended to the 
promise of planning, with the implication that a BSC-like performance measurement system can 
become the foundation for developing a more differentiated and capable organization.
In practice, however, the results are more contingent, with factors such as the interplay 
of organization culture and leadership being extremely significant in shaping the future of 
any organization. Efforts to use performance measures as a basis for strategic planning and 
management has its limitations and distorting effects—a point acknowledged in several follow-
up case studies by Kaplan and Norton (e.g. Kaplan 2001, 368). The BSC approach reflects what 
Henry Mintzberg calls the “performance–control” model of traditional management.  When 
applied in the public sector, the “ultimate effect is to reinforce the old machine model.”
In other words, the performance model decentralizes in order to centralize; it loosens 
up in order to tighten up.  And tightening up comes at the expense of flexibility, creativity, 
and individual initiative. Thus, the brave new world of [performance-based] public 
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management all too often comes down to nothing more than the same old machine 
management—new labels on old bottles. It works fine where machine management 
worked—sometimes even slightly better—but not anywhere else (Mintzberg 1996, 81).
Finally, although the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 was described as a major 
step forward in agency and program accountability, the act makes no mention of the fact that the 
actual work of federal agencies is now mostly done by third parties.  As we discuss in the next 
section, in the ensuing 18 years it has become increasingly clear that of the many factors influencing 
agency and program accountability, it is federal policy implementation by third parties that is most 
important (Radin 2006; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Handler 1996; Cooper 2003).  The 
failure of lawmakers to anticipate the salience of third parties explains in part why performance 
measurement has only marginally influenced the accountability of federal agencies and programs. 
When the eight points in Table 2 are brought together they form the basis of these claims—
accountability is most effective when:
• there is caution regarding causality;
• measures of performance are understood to be numeric interpretations of reality rather than 
facts; 
• measuring performances can provide information useful to the sharpening of questions;
• measures of the measurable, measures of processes in lieu of outcomes, and measures of the 
surrogates of results are understood to be useful and legitimate;
• measures of performance should further the distinctions and uniqueness of institutions and 
communities rather than encourage isomorphism;
• it is understood that doing what can be done is far better than doing nothing and that poor 
performance measures are evidence of investing in the nasty problems;
• performance measurements rarely improve the prospects for institutional or community-level 
innovations; and,
• public investments are most effective when they are long-term; short-term performance 
measurement is seldom the friend of long-term investing.
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Accountability in the Extended State
For the past quarter century, students of American political development (APD), such as Stephen 
Skowronek, Karen Orren, and David Carpenter (among others) (see Orren and Skowronek 
2004), have been exploring the emergence of the modern administrative state in the United 
States. Looking back at the watershed reforms of the Progressive Era, they have provided us 
with a historical narrative that helps explain some of the more idiosyncratic characteristics of 
today’s American governance system. The nominal American state that existed prior to 1877 (a 
pivotal year in Skowronek’s analysis, when Reconstruction ended in the South) was eventually 
replaced over the next four decades by one that injected national administrative capacities into 
the existing constitutional frame. The process of doing so, however, was highly politicized, and the 
result was a rather unique configuration of the modern bureaucratic state (Skowronek 1982).
At the same time as APD scholars were helping us understand the distinctive nature of the 
American Administrative State, students of public administration were attempting to understand 
the fundamental changes that were taking place from the 1970s onwards that challenged the 
foundations of that state. Privatization, deregulation, tax revolts, outsourcing, managerialism—all 
pointed to a fundamental shift in the nature of the American Administrative State. Several scholars 
(Brint Milward and Keith Provan [2000], B. Guy Peters [1994], R.A.W. Rhodes [1994]) termed this 
the rise of the “hollow state” in which many of the tasks and functions of government were being 
contracted out to third parties who would act in the name of the state (for general overview, see 
Milward & Provan 2000). Frederickson (1999) spoke of the fragmentation and “disarticulation” of 
the state and the reduced capacity of traditional bureaucratic forms to deal with the increasing 
demands made of the state.
Into this potentially critical situation there emerged the Extended State, as institutional forms and 
various networks and other collaborative arrangements began to fill the growing vacuum left 
by the increasingly incapacitated bureaucracies of the traditional Administrative State. Practical 
solutions quickly outpaced theories as public administrators found themselves “repositioned” as 
managers of governance in addition to their duties as managers of agencies (Frederickson 1999, 
2004). This is the context within which the promise of performance must now operate.
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The scope of federal government work that is 
outsourced, done by contractors, and grantees 
is astonishing.19 To illustrate, more than a decade 
ago it was estimated that there are more than 
seven contract employees for every one directly 
employed federal civil servant (Light 1999). Some 
make much higher estimates (Verkuil 2007).20 In 
this way the state is extended or made very much 
larger without having made the directly employed 
civil services larger. Many agencies of government 
are indeed “hollowed out” in the sense that most of the substantive work of the agency is all 
contracted out, leaving the agency to engage primarily in contract management and oversight. 
Ensuring accountability to federal government purposes in the context of service delivery via 
contractors is, at best, problematic (U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009).
A recent study of federal policy implementation by contracts and grants from the perspective 
of accountability and performance measurement is helpful in giving a sense of the complicated 
situation created by the Extended State. The Frederickson and Frederickson (2006) findings in 
Measuring the Performance of the Hollow State generally confirm the point made more than 80 
years ago by Mary Parker Follett, who wrote that “we see that the place in which orders are 
given, the circumstances under which they are given, may make all the difference in the world as 
to the response which we get. Hand them down a long way from President or Works Manager 
and the effect is weakened. One might say that the strength of a favourable response to an order 
is in inverse ratio to the distance the order travels” (Follett 1926/2003, 27). Follett’s hypothesis 
had to do with giving orders in a standard organizational hierarchy. If one substitutes goals for 
orders, and if one assumes that Follett’s description of a “favourable response” is essentially 
the same thing as accountability to program goals, then the Fredericksons’ findings support her 
19  In 1996, President Clinton declared that “the era of big government is over.” Upon looking back it could be 
said that “the era of big government is over, to be replaced by the era of really big government.”
20  Amazingly, it is nearly impossible to come up with more than a guess on this figure or, for that matter, the 
number of real federal employees. For example, a position that might be counted as an FTE government employee 
might be (and in some agencies, frequently is) filled by a temporary contract employee (usually through a contracting 
employment company, who employs staff to run the contract relationship), while at times those positions might be 
counted as actual employees (FTEs) but go unfilled either by government worker or contractor for extended periods of 
time.
The scope of federal government work 
that is outsourced, done by contractors, 
and grantees is astonishing.  To illustrate, 
more than a decade ago it was estimated 
that there are more than seven contract 
employees for every one directly employed 
federal civil servant (Light 1999). Some 
make much higher estimates.  In this way 
the state is extended or made very much 
larger without having made the directly 
employed civil services larger.
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hypothesis. On the basis of those findings, and adapting Follett’s hypothesis to a modern third-
party government, they suggest that the strength of agency accountability to program goals is 
in reverse ratio to the distances actual implementation travels and the layers of third parties 
through which implementation travels.
In the Extended State, much of the modern federal government could be organizationally 
understood as vertical networks of third parties. If, as Follett claims, the length of these 
articulations matter, so too do the unique characteristics of the third parties in those networks 
matter. For example, agency performance in the context of federal-state relations and state 
implementation of federal policy is very different from agency performance in the context of for-
profit contractors.
The applicability of accountability mechanisms is clearly influenced by the characteristics of third-
party agents. This is as true for private sector outsourcing as it is for the public sector.  Academics 
who study “transaction costs economics” note that there are three basic costs to outsourcing: 
production costs, bargaining costs, and opportunity costs (Vining & Globerman 1999). The first of 
those is straightforward and addresses the question: how much will be saved or gained (in terms 
of human and material resources, and so on) by turning over the work of the organization to 
outsiders? The second and third costs, however, are more complicated and more directly involve 
accountability. Bargaining costs involve not only the striking of a bargain or agreement, but also 
developing and sustaining monitoring (pre-factum) and enforcement (post-factum) mechanisms 
related to the agreement. Opportunity costs cover those behaviors and events that occur outside 
the bargain—events that change or exceed the circumstances considered in the agreement. 
Fraudulent behavior by an employee, a natural disaster, the collapse of financial markets, or lack 
of access to funding source—some unanticipated, some part of the assumed risk that such “bad 
stuff” won’t happen. These too generate a need for some accountability mechanisms. In fact, one 
might consider that portion of overall transaction costs linked to pre-factum and post-factum 
mechanisms as a distinct category—accountability costs.
Of course, there are third parties, and then there are third parties. The extent to which 
accountability mechanisms seek to deal with the problem of control, it matters whether the 
third parties are states, commercial contractors, research grantees, nonprofits, or commercial 
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firms engaged in governmentally guided performance of public sector functions. Direct control 
is difficult given the nonhierarchical nature of the relationship, although there are instances when 
the contractor is subordinated into the bureaucratic process of an agency. For example, a number 
of employees at one federal passport processing center are contractors who work side-by-side 
with government employees doing the same or similar tasks, and for all intents and purposes they 
act (and often feel like) regular employees during normal, day-to-day operations. 
But in the more typical nonhierarchical relationship, the procedure of choice for establishing 
control defaults to some form of performance measurement, and here the situation becomes 
complicated. Following the logic of performance measurement that is based on the bureaucratic 
model of the state, accountability to agency goals will improve as a result of the implementation 
of the GPRA and, during the Bush administration, PART performance-measurement requirements. 
According to the interview respondents in the Fredericksons’ study, the five federal agencies 
included improved their performance measurement capabilities. Therefore, following the logic 
of performance measurement, these agencies were more accountable for program outputs and 
even outcomes.  Although there is little evidence that performance measurement actually causes 
improved performance, agency officials tend to believe it does.
Frederickson and Frederickson (2006) describe the federal third-party agents as “articulated 
vertical networks of third parties,” articulation taken to mean jointed, as in an articulated bus 
or the articulation of cars in a train. The quality of articulation has to do with the extent to 
which separate organizations or institutions in a network are coupled, fit together, linked, or 
combined, as well as with the nature and quality of those connections.  Articulation can take 
many forms, including both block and categorical grants from the federal government to the 
states and territories or to other subgovernments; contracts let by the federal government or 
by subgovernments to nonprofit or for-profit third parties; the processes of regulating third 
parties; and the provision of funding to third parties with clients who have claims for services 
from these third parties. The point is that the wide variation of arrangements between the federal 
government and third parties and the remarkable variation in the purposes of these arrangements 
cannot be understood as just grants or contracts with third parties or subgovernments. The 
subject of federal grants and contracts is far more complex.  Although contracting out and 
privatization have received the bulk of public attention, contracts are only one form of the 
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devolution of federal program implementation by third parties. Formalized contracts between the 
federal government and third parties, however, are all various forms of articulations, almost all of 
them vertical (Salamon 1989).
In third-party grant and contract regimes, the form of articulation between agencies and their 
third parties ranges from remote control to managed networks. Remote control, according to 
Salamon (1989), is a loosely coupled grant or contract articulation in which third parties exercise 
wide discretion and latitude in both the management and the substance of policy implementation. 
Contracts for health research between the National Institutes of Health and hospitals and 
universities are a typical example. Managed networks, at the other extreme, are tightly coupled 
articulations between agencies and grant or contract third parties. Tight network management 
can be hierarchical or exercised through agency oversight programs, auditing procedures, carefully 
drafted contracts, tight contract management, negotiated shared understanding between agencies 
and third parties, and so forth.
The nature and quality of principal-agent network articulations that are on remote control 
rely primarily on accountability through pre-factum contracts granting considerable latitude or 
discretion to third parties on post-factum performance-measurement-based assumptions. By 
comparison, principal-agent network articulations that are managed illustrate the accountability 
promises of detailed contracts with little latitude and hierarchical control or bureaucratic 
contract and grant management processes.
Another factor to take into consideration is the fact that many governmental programs have 
multiple purposes.  The level of goal agreement or congruence in an agency’s statutory or 
regulatory foundations and the level of policy agreement among agency principals influences 
how they respond to the imperatives of accountability. In the context of contradictory or 
ambiguous goals, the fixing of accountability is rendered more difficult and less effective (Heinrich 
1999). Nowhere is this more evident than in the application of accountability expectations to 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  The FDA is expected to enable pharmaceutical and 
food products to reach market as quickly as possible, while at the same time assuring the public 
that those pharmaceutical and food products are safe.  Which of these goals FDA chooses to 
maximize is a function of many factors, with political forces in the congressional and executive 
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branches of government and the influence of the pharmaceutical industry being the most 
important.
In the 1990s, the FDA, along with many other regulatory agencies, was part of a distinct shift in 
approaches toward federal regulation of businesses (Heimann 1998).  This shift was away from 
traditional regulation toward both deregulation and a logic of partnership whereby regulators 
and regulated industries share regulatory roles. For the FDA this meant that pharmaceutical 
and food companies paid fees for regulatory services and expected, in return, timely reviews. 
In addition, regulated industries, such as the seafood industry, using agreed-upon standards and 
reporting protocols, were authorized to engage in self-regulation. But in 2004 and 2005, two 
drugs approved under these partnership arrangements, Vioxx and Bextra, were found to have 
undisclosed but known dangerous side effects and were taken from the market. The peanut 
butter-salmonella crisis again highlighted the FDA goal conflict issue. The tension between the 
FDA’s food and drug safety responsibilities and its food and drug promotion responsibilities 
shift as political forces shift from one emphasis to the other and back again (Heimann 1998).  
Accountability at the FDA is played out in the context of these contradictory and shifting goal 
emphases. Evidence of the influence of competing FDA goals is seen in the slowness of their 
GPRA performance-measurement development and in the ongoing aggregation and disaggregation 
of FDA performance measures. The decision to shift between two contradictory emphases 
is a policy rather than a performance challenge and one that performance measurement is 
ill-suited to solve. This policy challenge leaves the FDA in a position of attempting to manage 
its way around and through the problem of conflicting goals, and leaves the matter of agency 
accountability unresolved.
Medicare and Medicaid also have competing goals. Unlike FDA’s regulation/promotion goals, 
Medicare and Medicaid have financial service goals achieved through articulated networks of 
third parties—the states and their third-party contractors in the case of Medicaid and large-
scale health finance and insurance contractors in the case of Medicare. Clients are at the bottom 
of these vertical networks—clients who are entitled to Medicare and Medicaid services from 
doctors, pharmacies, hospitals, and nursing homes. Medicare and Medicaid are expected to finance 
health-care services to those who are eligible and at the same time to control health-care costs.
Although goal conflict is evident in the operations of the FDA, for Medicare, and Medicaid, it 
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appears that open consideration of conflicting 
goals by agencies is unacceptable as a matter of 
policy.  Accountability mechanisms, such as GPRA 
and PART performance measurement, did not 
attempt to reconcile these competing objectives.21 
Performance measures and the data needed 
to make them operative were never described 
in terms of possible goal conflict.  Agency and 
program goals are described as if they are in 
agreement or are compatible. Based on GPRA 
and PART reports, it is as if agency goal conflict and competition is the problem that dares not 
speak its name. In interviews with agency officials, however, agency goal conflict is a regular theme. 
There is some evidence, particularly at the FDA and the Center for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services (CMS), that performance measures are attempts to pave over goal conflicts, as if to claim 
that really good agency performance will somehow demonstrate that agencies can be equally 
accountable to conflicting or competing goals (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006.)  This would 
not be the first time that better management is thought to be the answer to vexing questions of 
goal conflict.
In the third-party government of today’s Extended State, policy implementation is, by definition, 
formally extended beyond an agency’s hierarchy.  There are variations in forms of agency 
centralization and decentralization, most particularly programmatic fragmentation and the 
geographic spread of policy implementation agents. Levels of centralization and decentralization of 
third-party policy implementation complicate agency accountability. Programs that use grants or 
contractors to provide services are decentralized by definition.
There appears to be an association between third-party government and the decentralization 
and fragmentation of the federal government. Patterns of policy implementation that are centrally 
funded and locally managed and delivered are now deeply established in contemporary federalism. 
In addition to geographic decentralization, federal program fragmentation is evident in the health 
21  Although the newly passed (2011) GPRAMA does attempt to address that situation through authorizing 
budgetary and management initiatives, time will tell if this adjustment in administrative policy overcomes the problem.
Performance measures and the data 
needed to make them operative were 
never described in terms of possible goal 
conflict.  Agency and program goals are 
described as if they are in agreement or 
are compatible. Based on GPRA and PART 
reports, it is as if agency goal conflict and 
competition is the problem that dares not 
speak its name. In interviews with agency 
officials, however, agency goal conflict is a 
regular theme.
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fields; each state and territory operates dozens of federally funded programs. Much of the actual 
operation of these programs at the street level is contracted out by the states and territories 
to private nonprofit or for-profit third parties. In every state and locality, federally funded 
health contractors operate as financial intermediaries or carriers, as health researchers or as 
providers of direct health and hospital services. It could be argued that third-party government, 
decentralized federalism, and program fragmentation are nearly the same thing.
How does the correlation between third-party government and decentralization influence 
accountability, and vice versa? The Fredericksons’ study of GPRA implementation indicates, 
first, that federal agencies with state, territorial, or tribal third parties will build performance-
measurement accountability mechanisms into more general patterns of negotiated cooperative 
federalism or federal-state mutual adjustment. In this context, third parties participate in 
goal-setting and performance-measurement decisions and become partners in GPRA-based 
performance-measurement implementation. The most volatile examples are Medicaid and 
Medicare, which both exhibit constantly changing and churning granting or contracting 
relationships between CMS and the states—a kind of marathon dance of accountability.
Most of the GPRA-related elements of agency-state relations tend to be among top executives 
at each level and among GPRA implementation specialists. The rank and file in state agencies that 
implement federal programs know little of GPRA or PART, and they assume that accountability 
through performance measurement is someone else’s responsibility. Medical research third 
parties are insulated from formalized accountability mechanisms—both agency goal setting 
and performance measurement. NIH has entirely walled off their grant recipients from any 
participation in accountability-based performance measurement and has developed centralized 
and effective GPRA compliance systems in the context of a decentralized and fragmented 
medical research model. In other words, performance-based accountability is not often left to 
third parties.
This suggests that under loosely coupled arrangements, GPRA is treated by the agencies as 
Washington-level bureaucratic requirements rather than as important elements of their day-
to-day contract and grant management of third-party policy implementation.  What may, in 
Washington, be thought of as essential features of accountability and good management tends not 
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to be reflected down loosely articulated chains of third-party implementers. Real accountability, 
therefore, following the definition of accountability at the beginning of this essay, may have less to 
do with formal systems of performance measurement, such as GPRA and PART, and more to do 
with grant and contract management and oversight at the operational level and with executive 
and legislative branch politics.
In the name of accountability, some nonprofit or for-profit contractors will be obliged to build 
data and other performance-measurement requirements into contracts. In ordinary contract 
circumstances third parties will be required to keep certain records and aggregate certain data. 
Contractors may not know the connection between what they are obligated to provide as a part 
of contracts and how that data might be used in measuring agency performance. Such contract 
regimes are top down principal-agent models that assume that it is possible to formalize reliable 
and consistent data requirements and expectations through compliance language (Radin 2006). 
Despite rules and regulations, the gathering, organization, and analysis of reliable and consistent 
performance-measurement data has proven to be an illusion.
When direct government programs operated by civil servants, on one hand, and grant- and 
contract-based third parties, on the other, were compared, in general terms direct government 
received significantly higher overall PART scores and, more specifically, higher scores for the 
management section of the PART. Research and development programs, which are mostly 
third-party based, are a marked exception to this generalization. Nevertheless, the quality of 
management and the nature of accountability in hollowed-out third-party-operated federal 
programs is very different from the management and accountability of directly operated federal 
programs. The accumulation of GPRA- and PART-based performance measurement results shines a 
strong light on these differences. One might conclude, on the basis of these data, that third-party-
operated federal programs are less accountable and less well managed; or one might conclude 
that articulated vertical networks of third parties will be inherently or, by their nature, less 
accountable to federal government objectives and less well managed, at least less well managed in 
terms of traditional definitions of management (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006, 182-183).
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Outsourcing the work of government, and particularly large-scale outsourcing, is a significant 
challenge to making effective use of accountability mechanisms as a means for dealing with the 
problems of governance. Putting aside the patterns of post-factum accountability associated with 
important errors, breakdowns, or scandals and turning instead to the routines of before-the-fact 
accountability, we learn that:
• in a general way, accountability, and particularly pre-factum accountability, is kept by systems 
and processes of organizational and managerial control; and
• large-scale outsourcing of the provision of governmental goods and services generally reduces 
the accountability of governmental agencies acting as contractees or grantees. 
We further learn that, in the context of Extended State outsourcing, accountability is more 
effective when: 
• the high variation in forms and types of public purposes and the unique patterns of 
contractee-contractor relations associated with them are recognized and developed. 
Specialization matters in the public sector, no less so when the administration of specialized 
public projects and services are outsourced. One size never fits all; 
• the possible attenuation of agency program goals associated with layers of third-party 
implementers are understood and mitigated; 
• the nature of relations between public agency contractees and their contractors are 
understood (tightly coupled, loosely coupled, managed, remote control, and so forth) and the 
appropriate form of control management are put in place; 
• third parties are not expected to solve the problems of ambiguous or competing public 
agency goals; and 
• third parties expected to gather and provide performance-measurement data are included in 
the processes by which the reasons for those data are determined and their possible uses are 
understood. 
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Accountability and the Search for a High-Trust Culture
We turn now from our evaluation of the contemporary promises of public sector accountability 
to our understanding and description of a preferred accountability—an idealized, aspirational, 
and hopeful accountability. From our evaluation of public sector accountability, it may seem that 
to this point we have emphasized the shortcomings and disappointments of the applications, 
mechanisms, and processes of accountability and downplayed many of the values or virtues of 
accountability. It is axiomatic that reforms, including the public sector accountability reform, tend 
to overpromise. It is also axiomatic that evaluations of reform will point to the shortcomings and 
disappointments in reform. Such is the nature of reform, and such is the nature of the evaluation 
of reform.
While we describe the disappointments and 
shortcomings in the application of public 
sector accountability reforms, we nevertheless 
acknowledge the significant contributions the 
accountability reform movement has made 
to governance.  At the foundation of these 
contributions is a particularly important shift in 
what public sector accountability is understood 
to be. Traditionally, accountability was understood to look back, to be held to account for 
past errors or mistakes; accountability was understood to be associated with an event, an 
incident, or an action for which one or more persons would be expected to be accountable. 
Contemporary administrative reforms and the creation of modern bureaucratic infrastructures 
(e.g., red tape) can be regarded as efforts to promote efficiency and rationality, but also a means 
for shifting accountability from post factum to pre factum. Indeed, one can see a similar shift 
in managerial theories of motivation, with a shift from the emphasis on rewards and sanctions 
to those that stress commitment, morale, and self-actualization. But just as overreliance on 
post-factum mechanisms can prove dysfunctional, so can an overemphasis on pre-factum 
mechanisms that—taken to their logical extreme—foster the empty promises of accountability. 
Whatever benefits might be gained from the shift toward pre-factum mechanisms is likely to be 
outweighed by the costs when taken too far.  The experience of No Child Left Behind is merely 
one very visible example. 
It is axiomatic that reforms, including the 
public sector accountability reform, tend 
to overpromise. It is also axiomatic that 
evaluations of reform will point to the 
shortcomings and disappointments in 
reform. Such is the nature of reform, and 
such is the nature of the evaluation of 
reform.
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Which leads us to consider an alternative approach based on the one common characteristic of 
both pre- and post-factum accountability—that is, their focus on the need for social mechanisms 
(broadly defined) to generate accountable responses.  Accountability involves the act (post 
factum) or expectation (pre factum) of account giving, and either requires the presence or 
possibility of social mechanisms to be fulfilled. But there is another factor that comes into play 
and that is the setting within which the mechanisms operate. These settings—whether regarded 
as cultural contexts, institutional settings, task environments—give form and meaning to account-
giving mechanisms. They are the structures, values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes that are requisite 
for account giving, and they constitute the venues and infrastructure of accountability.  Without 
taking them into consideration, we cannot make sense of account giving successes or failures, nor 
can we hope to make changes that will enhance or strengthen accountability.
In our effort to unpack and reconceptualize accountability, we would put forward the idea 
that it is not enough to think of accountability as mechanisms or tools of governance. Instead, 
we offer the view that accountability settings are the core and key factors that must be taken 
into consideration whenever we evaluate accountability or consider reforms to enhance and 
strengthen account giving. 
In the expanding literature on accountability, the settings are discussed in various ways, usually as 
cultures of accountability or accountability regimes. These are typically viewed as composites of 
accountability mechanisms, but we offer a stronger view that treats these contexts as a holistic 
construct that includes pre- and post-factum mechanisms and more.
What does that “more” involve? That is the critical question that needs answering if we are to 
advance the cause of improving and strengthening accountable governance. We take our lead from 
Adam Smith, whose contribution to the study of accountability is rarely acknowledged. For Smith, 
accountability was sewn into the very fabric of society.  “A moral being is an accountable being,” 
he stated in the first edition of his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759, III, 1)—thus articulating a 
basic premise that informs all his later work, including The Wealth of Nations. Contrary to his 
reputation as an egoist philosopher, Smith believed that any and all social interaction is judged 
not only by an individual’s immediate self-interest, but also by the judgments of an “impartial 
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spectator” that inhabits one’s character.22 In that sense, Smith established nothing less than the 
first modern theory of accountability, and one is able to see his view of markets in an entirely 
different light once his idea of moral accountability is taken into consideration.
Cultures are important factors in shaping human choices and behaviors. “Shared values, shared 
beliefs, shared meaning, shared understanding, and shared sense making are all different ways of 
describing culture. … These patterns of understanding help us cope with the situations being 
encountered and also provide a basis for making our own behavior sensible and meaningful” 
(Morgan 2006, 1348). Building on that idea, we can see several different types of accountability 
cultures that have a profound influence on accountable governance.23 
Among the most evident is the culture of professionalism. Sociologists who study professions 
have always found it difficult to characterize them, but generally they involve a community of 
actors who possess a body of knowledge and a set of values related to the use of their expertise. 
Depending on how one defines a profession, their historical role in American government can 
be traced back to the founding. But there is no question that by the 1960s, professionalism was a 
pervasive characteristic of the American Administrative State—so much so that it was worthy of 
close examination by one of the leaders of the field, Frederick Mosher, in a classic 1968 treatment, 
as well as two symposia in Public Administration Review a decade later (see Mosher 1978). Culturally, 
professions operate as moral communities in the sense that their actions are supposed to reflect 
an internalized moral obligation that emerges from one’s general involvement in a bounded 
community of professional peers who adhere to an explicit set of shared values and norms. 
22  “When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, either to 
approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were into two persons; and that I, the 
examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and 
judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by 
placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. 
The second is the agent, the person who I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I 
was endeavouring to form some opinion. The first is the judge; the second the person judged of. But that the judge should, 
in every respect, be the same with the person judged of, is as impossible that the cause should, in every respect, be the 
same with the effect” (TMS, III, 1.6). 
23  Analytically, we can talk about the existence of accountability cultures which, for present purposes, can be 
defined as those perceived obligations and expectations for account giving that are embedded within the sociocultural environment 
of an individual or organization. This is a modified version of a similar concept—accountability web—used in Gelfand et al. 
(2004).  The work of Gelfand and colleagues draws, in turn from Frink and Ferris (1998).
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What is key in professional setting are both the shared values and the boundaries that define 
membership in the community.  This setting is where professional accountability cultures thrive, 
and in government it is exemplified most effectively by those in the uniformed professions (e.g., 
the military, law enforcement, the U.S. Forest Service).
This response is not surprising since most descriptions of agencies, organizations, or programs 
as accountable are generally understood to mean accountable to organizational purposes. 
Following this usage of accountability, we found most public agencies to be generally accountable 
to their goals or purposes, recognizing, of course, that there are degrees or gradients of 
public organizational accountability. The degree, level, or quality of public sector accountability, 
understood within this cultural setting, turns on traditional factors that are thought to determine 
organizational effectiveness—leadership, commitment to mission, resources, and political support.
There are several excellent examples of so-called high-trust public agencies. Such agencies tend 
to have leaders who serve for long periods of time. There are several good reasons that the GAO 
has a well-established high-trust culture, exemplified by the 15-year term of appointment for the 
Comptroller General (Walker 1986).  Admiral Hyman G. Rickover’s 63-year tenure in the U.S. 
Navy no doubt accounted for the high-trust culture of the submarine service and the nuclear 
navy (Blair 1954). Strong identification with an organization’s purposes, so-called mission valence, 
is still another feature of high-trust organizations: the U.S. Forest Service (Kaufman 1967) is one 
example, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was another, until it suffered some reputational 
damage following the death of J. Edgar Hoover. Symbols like organizational seals, prizes or awards 
for extraordinary service, uniforms, and social and moral reward systems recognize the sense of 
duty and public spiritedness of workers (DiIulio 1995). These high culture public organizations 
have been and are still notably accountable. These forms of accountability are an inherent part of 
the moral order. 
But trust is more than a reflection of long-term leadership. The economist and Nobel Laureate 
Kenneth Arrow points out that “trust has a very important pragmatic value, if nothing else. Trust 
is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to 
have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word. Unfortunately this is not a commodity that 
can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, you already have some doubt about what you have 
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bought” (Arrow 1974, 23). High levels of trust are fundamental to the functioning of accountable 
public organizations.  At an elemental level, trust is between one person and another. But trust 
takes on increasing levels of abstraction, as in trust between families, trust in the work group, 
intraorganizational trust, interorganizational trust, and so forth. Habits of trust are exhibited 
when drivers instinctively obey street signs and diners instinctively tip servers. In his monumental 
study of trust, Francis Fukuyama described the United States as a high-trust society, but he 
covers extensively recent declines in American trust (Fukuyama 1995). Fukuyama’s description of 
trust at the community level is surprisingly close to descriptions of accountability:  “As a general 
rule, trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create 
expectations of regular and honest behavior.  To some extent, the particular character of these 
values is less important than the fact that they are shared” (1995, 153).
Our basic contention is that accountability 
cultures are important to the successful design 
and maintenance of accountable governance in 
the traditional Administrative State. The central 
question we now ask is whether they are also 
important and appropriate when dealing with the 
issues and challenges generated by the Extended 
State. If outsourcing government goods and 
services reduces accountability, as the evidence 
presented earlier shows, what can be done to achieve higher levels of contractor accountability? 
Can there be an idealized, aspirational, and hopeful accountability under conditions of widespread 
outsourcing and the growing use of third parties to perform government functions? 
The answer can be found in some notable cases where the cultural factor comes into play.  The 
research and development (R and D) functions of the federal government may be regarded as an 
important exception to the earlier point that in comparative terms outsourced public services 
tend to be less effective, less well managed, and less accountable than directly operated federal 
agencies. The operations of federal R and D agencies are particularly challenging in terms of 
accountability because their tasks tend to be exploratory, the means by which their objectives are 
to be achieved are often unclear, and genuine performance almost always takes many years rather 
than a single year. Here we will focus on the operations of the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
If outsourcing government goods and 
services reduces accountability, as the 
evidence presented earlier shows, what 
can be done to achieve higher levels of 
contractor accountability? Can there be 
an idealized, aspirational, and hopeful 
accountability under conditions of 
widespread outsourcing and the growing 
use of third parties to perform government 
functions?
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NIH has about 18,000 directly employed staff, many of them engaged in contract and grant 
management. This is a considerably larger grant and contract management staff than one finds in 
other federal agencies that outsource much of their work. There is little doubt that NIH spends 
more per dollar on contract management than most other federal agencies. The best estimate 
is that the annual sum of NIH grants and contracts supports a full time equivalent workforce of 
approximately 190,000 persons scattered among the leading American medical research centers, 
medical schools, and universities. Put another way, there are about 11 FTE persons engaged in 
NIH funded medical and health research for every 1 direct NIH employee (Frederickson and 
Frederickson 2006). These researchers are scattered across the United States, making NIH one of 
the most geographically decentralized agencies in the federal government, at least in terms of its 
grant-funded third parties. 
Medical schools and universities organize their research functions on the basis of NIH centers 
and institutes, with laboratories for cancer,  AIDS, and the other diseases around which NIH is 
organized. In addition, medical schools and health-research organizations are fully geared up to 
follow NIH grant criteria and protocols. These schools, research organizations, and the various 
institutes of NIH have interdependent and symbiotic relationships that have evolved over many 
years. Medical schools and health-research organizations are staffed by highly educated and 
qualified scientific researchers on the basis of assumptions of a close and continuing relationship 
based on staff expertise, consistent research success, and the probability of NIH financial support. 
In turn, NIH serves as a consistent and usually reliable source of financial support. Although NIH 
grants are made on a competitive basis, using juries and forms of peer review, this competition 
is within the narrow symbiotic range of established NIH-medical school or health-research 
organizations. 
The NIH initial response to GPRA in the 1990s was interesting and unique. First, NIH chose 
very general goals that cut across their various institutes, such as “develop new and improved 
methods for diagnosing disease and disability.” Second, research-grant-receiving third parties are 
given rather wide discretion as they engage in the sometimes untidy and unpredictable pursuit 
of discoveries. Third, grant-receiving third parties are insulated from the strategic-planning/
performance-measurement processes associated with the NIH implementation of GPRA. 
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Easily, the most interesting feature of the NIH response to the accountability assumptions in 
GPRA was their initial decision to use qualitative rather than quantitative performance measures. 
NIH accountability data were “science advances,” one-page narratives that detail a particular 
scientific discovery;  “science capsules,” one-paragraph narratives that give a snapshot of particular 
research endeavors; and “stories of discovery,” one- or two-page narratives that emphasize the 
aggregation of long-range processes of medical research. NIH assigned skilled writers to draft 
these qualitative measures, and they are interesting, engaging, and in some cases, compelling. They 
are certainly more interesting than standard performance-measure spreadsheets. 
According to one NIH official, this is how NIH decided they would implement their performance-
measurement responsibilities:
Well, there was actually a lot of discussion about whether we could use these traditional 
quantitative methods because, in a way, it would have been easier for us to just use 
numbers. But we thought that just because we can count it doesn’t mean we should, 
and doesn’t mean that it would be meaningful. We felt very strongly that just counting 
was not going to be useful for demonstrating our accountability to the public and what 
they’re getting for their research dollars.  We needed a more descriptive way to say,  
“Here’s the actual outcomes of our research program. Here’s what we found, here’s 
what we do, here’s what comes from this.” So we thought that the publication of our 
stories is certainly an important vehicle for this—it’s the knowledge of new treatments 
and diagnostics that comes from our research that really needs to be demonstrated 
(Frederickson and Frederickson 2006, 99).
After several years of the use of qualitative performance measures, NIH changed to standard 
annual quantitative measures. It is unclear why, but at the time (1999) the Office of Management 
and Budget was raising the performance-measurement bar.
The case of NIH’s initial approach to GPRA serves as a good example of how accountability 
cultures can be related to Extended State conditions. Those engaged in medical research at NIH 
and at each of the third-party grant and contract organizations share a common educational 
background and commitment to scientific health research, and one can classify them as a moral 
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community reflected in a common professional 
culture rooted in the shared research endeavor. 
But there were other accountability cultures at 
work as well.  Although the model is fragmented 
and decentralized, over time, research cultures 
flourish and identify the productive, creative, and 
trustworthy.  This arrangement has certain political 
advantages based on the geographic spread of 
resources and based on its often compelling search 
for cures (commitment), and also because some 
of the best known NIH grant recipients are either 
prestigious scholars or are associated with prestigious organizations (reputation).  As significant, 
the relationship among NIH and its many third-party partners was a clear example of a high-trust 
culture of accountability based on organizational interactions.
Another example of extraordinary public accountability in an Extended State context is to 
be seen in the operation of commercial air travel in the United States. Commercial air travel 
is a complex, fragmented array of horizontal, vertical, and lateral linkages between multiple 
jurisdictions at all levels of American government; a wide variety of types of corporations and 
unions; and a wide range of types of contractors—a system or network rather than a hierarchy 
(Frederickson and LaPorte 2002). Commercial air-passenger security is part of a unique class 
of institutional characteristics and challenges that are collectively described as “high-reliability 
organizations” (HROs). The perspective of high-reliability organizations is based on many years 
of direct observation of error-intolerant systems, such as commercial air travel, nuclear power 
generation, nuclear submarine and aircraft carrier operations, production of the components of 
nuclear weapons, and electricity generation and transmission systems. In the history of American 
commercial air travel we find outstanding examples of both post-factum and pre-factum 
accountability.  As important, we also find the strong influence of accountability cultures.
The case of NIH’s initial approach to 
GPRA serves as a good example of how 
accountability cultures can be related to 
Extended State conditions. Those engaged 
in medical research at NIH and at each 
of the third-party grant and contract 
organizations share a common educational 
background and commitment to scientific 
health research, and one can classify 
them as a moral community reflected in a 
common professional culture rooted in the 
shared research endeavor.
     59
The colossal failure of airport and commercial air travel safety on September 11, 2001, resulted 
in the loss of 3,100 lives and untold billions of dollars in damage to buildings and other physical 
infrastructure. The events of that day eventually resulted in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the events of that day raised troubling questions about the reliability and security 
of American commercial air travel.  After the terrorism of that day the standard pattern of post-
factum account giving played out with legislative hearings, blue ribbon panel and commission 
appointments, panel and commission reports, and large-scale governmental reorganization. That 
is traditional accountability.
But the events of 9/11 were the exception in the extreme. Consider pre-factum accountability 
in the day-to-day functioning of American commercial air travel. On any Friday between 3:00 
and 7:00 p.m. about 500,000 Americans will be on airplanes traveling at 500 miles per hour 
in every conceivable direction, all guided by the air-traffic control system. This unique class of 
organizational systems works in the context of essential insistence that it be nearly failure free, 
and, with rare exceptions, it is. That each of these Americans will reach their destinations safely 
is not regarded as exceptional or miraculous, but a system failure would be regarded as dramatic 
and horrible.
The density of the commercial air travel HRO is remarkable.  Airports are owned and operated 
by municipalities or local public authorities. Airplanes are built by commercial firms and 
owned by commercial airline companies responsible for their maintenance and operation. 
Airline passenger and baggage screening is the responsibility of the Transportation Security 
Administration, an agency of the federal Department of Homeland Security.  Airplane surface 
travel, take off, landing, and in-flight control is managed by the air-traffic control system of the 
Federal Aviation Administration, part of the U.S. Department of  Transportation.  And these are 
just the larger, more obvious parts of the commercial air-travel HRO system.
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Observations of the commercial aviation high-reliability system, as well as other HROs, can be 
summed-up with the following generalizations:
• First, the physical technologies (radar, hydraulics, and so on) of these systems are tightly 
coupled, meaning that an important breakdown anywhere along the production process may 
cause the entire system to fail.  
• Second, this tight coupling is characterized by fixed and relatively rigid standard operating 
procedures, or procedure protocols, that do not ordinarily vary; this means that administrative 
discretion is sharply reduced. 
• Third, humans operating at any point in the production process of high reliability systems 
require extensive technological training and constant retraining. 
• Fourth, such systems are ordinarily funded to a level that will guarantee high efficiency, or, 
to put it differently, efficiency is much more important than economy in the world of high 
reliability. 
• Fifth, such systems are highly redundant, there being two, three, or even four back-up, 
or redundant, systems ready to take over should the primary systems fail. One thinks 
immediately of the redundancy that saved the Apollo 13 space mission. 
• Sixth, these systems are highly networked, meaning that many organizations are in the 
production chain. 
• Seventh, these systems are composed of a marvelous mix of governmental, nongovernmental, 
and commercial organizations, the very definition of high-functioning public-private 
partnerships. 
• Eighth, when the systems are working properly, error reporting is encouraged and not 
punished; indeed, initiatives to identify flaws in procedures and protocols and thereby avoid 
failure are rewarded.
• Ninth, ordinarily such systems are rather hierarchical, both within the system and within the 
organization making up the system. But at times of peak load and emergencies, one finds rule 
switching by which officials move away from hierarchy and procedures to seek the expertise 
or experience that might account for or explain an anomaly and suggest possible nonroutine 
solutions. 
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These failure-free systems reveal how remarkably 
effective modern public and private organizations 
can be if they have adequate resources and are well 
managed.  To be sure, failure-free systems are the 
subject of intense public scrutiny because of the 
visibility of failures, however rare. 
There will be failures and there will be accidents; 
simple probability demonstrates that it is so (Perrow 
1999). But every day, we all enjoy the modern 
miracles of high-reliability systems.  And, interestingly, 
when they fail, it is usually because of human fallibility. It is difficult to imagine modern life without 
high-reliability commercial air travel. When it works perfectly, nothing appears to happen; in 
fact, everything happens properly. Commercial air travel is the very definition of successful 
accountability in an Extended State context.
And yet, underlying all the pre-factum accountability mechanisms that make this complex 
interorganizational arrangement operate are interactive cultural settings, from those emphasizing 
the professionalism of pilots and other specialists, to a general commitment to safety and 
industrywide efforts to promote and sustain positive reputation for effective and efficient 
performance.  All these come together in an accountability culture of high trust so pervasive that 
on most days the system operates without even a thought as to who might be blamable for some 
tragic mishap since there exists a widespread belief that such an event is highly unlikely. 
Viewing accountable governance through the lens of accountability settings and cultures adds 
considerably to our understanding of how the Extended State can meet the challenges of efficient 
management, effective performance, and democratic legitimacy.  The insights are anecdotal and 
tentative at this point, and what is required is a closer empirical examination of the dynamics of 
accountability that takes place in Extended State settings. One initial conclusion is that of the four 
accountability cultures, the most important in most public sector situations seems to be the high-
trust type. In a sense, it is the setting that encompasses the other three and (as we contend in the 
next section) the one most closely associated with the holy grail of democratic legitimacy. 
Every day, we all enjoy the modern 
miracles of high-reliability systems. 
And, interestingly, when they fail, it is 
usually because of human fallibility. 
It is difficult to imagine modern life 
without high-reliability commercial air 
travel. When it works perfectly, nothing 
appears to happen; in fact, everything 
happens properly. Commercial air 
travel is the very definition of successful 
accountability in an Extended State 
context.
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This is the major point the message delivered so 
effectively by philosopher Onora O’Neill in her BBC 
Reith Lectures, titled “A Question of Trust” (O’Neill 
2002). In those lectures, O’Neill points to the fact that 
while we are increasingly dependent on others, we are 
also increasingly suspicious of them.  Whether it be 
the highly trained health-care professional, the flight 
attendant demonstrably committed to our safety, or 
an Internet company executive claiming to be a strict 
guardian of our privacy, we remain concerned about 
the reliability of those mechanisms in place within their cultural settings that they claim hold them 
to account.  Trust me, I’m a professional! Trust me, I really care about your well-being! Trust me, 
I am a person of high integrity who would not risk her reputation by making false promises! But 
a great many of us respond with skepticism, for our general culture does not promote trusting 
attitudes toward those who make such claims. For O’Neill, the result is a rush to impose more 
and more accountability requirements that undermine rather than enhance trust. 
O’Neill’s observations highlight the importance of focusing on the development of high-trust 
accountability cultures. High levels of trust do not eliminate the need for pre- or post-factum 
mechanisms, but rather changes the role and functionality of those instruments. This was 
difficult to achieve under the traditional Administrative State—and it is critical for our successful 
transition to an Extended State in an atmosphere where public accountability is even more crucial 
to deal with our complex problems.
High levels of trust do not eliminate 
the need for pre- or post-factum 
mechanisms, but rather changes 
the role and functionality of those 
instruments. This was difficult to achieve 
under the traditional Administrative 
State—and it is critical for our 
successful transition to an Extended 
State in an atmosphere where public 
accountability is even more crucial to 
deal with our complex problems.
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Conclusions: Public Accountability and the Extended State
Although it may seem abstract and somewhat idealistic, a reconceptualization of public 
administration has emerged in recent years, a reconceptualization that should inform the 
subject of public accountability. Until rather recently the word public in public administration was 
understood to mean essentially the same thing as “government,” that public administration is 
the same thing as government administration. In the early 1980s, David Mathews pointed out 
that “public” is a pregovernmental concept, a concept much larger than government, and that 
government is just one of the ways the public or a public expresses itself (1984). Barry Bozeman 
argued that all organizations are public, just differently public (2004). Frederickson then pressed 
the claim that governments are unlikely to effectively manage the modern challenges they face 
without an increased emphasis on the public in public administration (1997). The primary reason 
is the growing mismatch between social and economic problems on one hand and the declining 
capacity of governmental jurisdictions to contain or to manage those problems on the other.
Public management is now understood to include government but also all of those organizations 
and institutions that contract with government to do governmental work. Public administration 
in the Extended State includes those institutions and organizations that are essentially public 
serving—the so-called nongovernmental public sector organizations—and the wide range 
of organizations and institutions that are essentially quasi-governmental in their relationship 
with citizens, such as privately held utilities. The distinctions between institutions that are 
essentially public in character and institutions that are private and profit making are now fuzzy 
(Bozeman 2004). Modern public-management scholars have developed a nuanced conception of 
institutions that are governmental, nonprofit, and corporate, but also primarily public serving, on 
the one hand, and institutions that are clearly profit making and in an identifiable market, on the 
other hand. 
The modern field of public administration is increasingly understood to encompass or include 
government and the full range of nonprofit, nongovernmental, and commercial firms engaged in 
public work. This is especially the case for all the public services delivered by nongovernmental 
organizations that are financed by governmental revenues.  At the center of this reasoning are 
efforts to make the logic of public accountability and particularly pre-factum public accountability 
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operational in the public service work of nongovernmental organizations. Such efforts may 
include codes of public service ethics, public service oaths, inclusion of the meaning of public 
service in training programs, and so forth. Such efforts are especially urgent in nongovernmental 
organizations operating prisons and other parts of the criminal justice system; nongovernmental 
organizations operating so-called back office governmental tasks; nongovernmental organizations 
doing the anti-terrorism work associated with water, food, and drug supplies, air quality and other 
environmental vulnerabilities; and so forth. However idealistic and optimistic, the aim would be 
to strengthen public accountability by strengthening the high-trust public service cultures of all of 
those organizations that do public work. 
 
The rhetoric associated with large-scale outsourcing provides certain clues to contemporary 
thinking about the increasing role of nongovernmental organizations in the provision of public 
goods and services. Some phrases used to describe this phenomenon are distinctly questioning 
or imply concern or disagreement; such as “third-party government,” “the shadow bureaucracy,” 
“the state of agents,” “hollowed out.” These descriptors tend to be used by scholars who 
study modern public administration. Phrases that are thought to be more neutral or to be 
distinctly pro-business include “public-private partnerships,” “the blended workforce,” “relational 
contracting,” “collaborative governance,” and “vested outsourcing.” These phrases are more 
commonly used by consultants, corporate executives, and pro-business outsourcing scholars. 
The title and subtitle of a recent book on the subject is revealing. John D. Donahue and Richard 
J. Zeckhauser of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, under the title Collaborative 
Governance: Private Roles for Public Goals in Turbulent Times, write: 
All too often government lacks the skill, the will, and the wallet to meet its missions. 
Schools fall short of the mark while roads and bridges fall into disrepair. Health care 
costs too much and delivers too little. Budgets bleed red ink as the costs of services 
citizens want outstrips the taxes they are willing to pay. Collaborative Governance is the 
first book to offer solutions by demonstrating how government at every level can engage 
the private sector to overcome seemingly insurmountable problems and achieve public 
goals more effectively (2011, inside flyleaf). 
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The word governance, as distinct from government, 
has come increasingly to mean the engagement of 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations 
in the functioning of the Extended State. The 
phrase collaborative governance strengthens the 
description of cooperation between governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations in the 
Extended State.  And the phrase public goals as 
against governmental goals in the subtitle elevates 
the goals that collaboration with the private sector 
would help achieve. Note, however, the use of the 
phrase private roles, to describe the roles of private 
sector rather than a phrase that might have served 
to describe the public roles of the private sector 
when it engages in public work. 
Many nonprofit and corporate organizations are engaged solely, by contracting, in public work. Such 
organizations may not be governmental but they certainly are public. Many, if not most, of these 
organizations are trusted and reliable partners in the implementation of public policy. Is it idealistic 
to expect a public ethos to emerge in these organizations, an ethos of public accountability and 
particularly pre-factum accountability? Can there be such a public ethos or moral community shared 
between contracting principals and contractor agents?
At the outset of this monograph we highlighted the three problems of governance that 
accountability addresses—accountability achieved by and through organizational and managerial 
control, particularly in the context of the extended state; accountability achieved by and through 
performance measurement; and accountability achieved by and through democratic government. 
Of the three, it is the last of these that is the most empirically informed. Recall that we found 
evidence of weak electoral accountability in the practices of traditional democratic politics, the 
politics of parties, campaigns, campaign financing, interest groups, elections, law and policymaking, 
and budget making. This form of political accountability is weak because the political process is so 
often rigged in favor of incumbents and because political accountability exercises tend to be post-
factum account-giving hearings that are often political theater rather than serious account giving.
Many nonprofit and corporate 
organizations are engaged solely, 
by contracting, in public work. Such 
organizations may not be governmental 
but they certainly are public. Many, if 
not most, of these organizations are 
trusted and reliable partners in the 
implementation of public policy. Is it 
idealistic to expect a public ethos to 
emerge in these organizations, an ethos 
of public accountability and particularly 
pre-factum accountability? Can there be 
such a public ethos or moral community 
shared between contracting principals and 
contractor agents?
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Stronger forms of democratic accountability and particularly accountability based on high levels 
of trust are to be found in the locally based civic deliberation, social capital, and civil society 
movement. By any reckoning the evidence is impressive.24 Using the 50 states as the data base 
(and controlling for the standard list of socioeconomic and demographic factors), states with 
higher levels of social capital have children who are healthier, better educated, and safer. Schools 
work better in high social-capital states. Kids watch less television in high social-capital states. 
Violent crime is rarer in high social-capital states. The economies of high social-capital states are 
stronger. People live longer and tend to be happier in high social-capital states. Tax evasion is low 
where social capital is high.  Although the statistical signs are weaker, social capital and tolerance 
(race, gender, and civil liberties) go together. Greater concern for civic and economic equality is 
found in high social-capital states (Putnam 2000). Taken together, these findings are evidence of 
high-trust cultures and reflect high prospects for strong forms of public accountability rooted in 
civil deliberation and social capital. 
Clues in the search for the high-trust accountable cultures are found in: 
• the modern reconceptualization of accountability to acknowledge the role played by pre-
factum forms of accountability;
• many examples of high culture and high-trust organizations that have been and are successful;
• the National Institutes of Health as an example of operationalizing high-trust accountability 
cultures in the context of large-scale outsourcing; 
• the operations of high-reliability organizations and particularly commercial air travel as 
evidence of an accountable Extended State; and
• attempts to both clarify and press the claim that nongovernmental organizations engaged 
by contract to do public work are expected to have a public ethos and to be publically 
accountable. 
24  Measuring social capital in the United States includes measures of community organizational life, levels of 
engagement in public affairs, measures of community volunteerism, measures of informal sociability, and measures of social 
trust (Putnam 2000, 287-295).
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* * *
Few phrases are as compelling and powerful as public accountability. The many uses of that phrase 
have given it a privileged place in the grammar of public policy and administration. It is not just 
grammar; the engagement of governmental and policy applications or practices in the name of 
public accountability have been and continue to be important. As the preceding pages attest, the 
applications and practices of public accountability often have fallen short of the rhetoric.  While 
such shortcomings disappoint, they do not negate its potential. If anything, both the theories and 
the applications of public accountability, to date, have been beneath its potential and have not 
used its privileges to advantage. 
Public accountability is neither a fad nor a 
passing fancy; it is here to stay. Indeed, public 
accountability and its attendant concepts and 
practices are so essential to modern public 
policymaking and policy implementation as to have 
become the subject. The primary reason for the 
ascendency of public accountability, we suspect, 
has to do with the limitations of governmental jurisdictions, the extension of governmental 
jurisdictions by outsourcing, and the growing importance of distinctly public functions exercised 
by nongovernmental organizations. It is the concepts and practices of public accountability that 
provide the handles that scholars and public officials grip as they cope with the challenges of 
modern governance. 
The first and most important of these handles is to understand the modern use of the word 
accountability and the concepts and applications that flow from that understanding.  Accountability 
and particularly public accountability is both post-factum account giving after an event, a failure, or 
a mistake; and pre-factum organizational and managerial procedures, processes, and practices that 
are designed to cause or result in accountability to public goals or purposes. Given this modern 
understanding of accountability, it could be said that most governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations engaged in serving the public are, to some extent, accountable to their public policy 
Public accountability is neither a fad nor 
a passing fancy; it is here to stay. Indeed, 
public accountability and its attendant 
concepts and practices are so essential to 
modern public policymaking and policy 
implementation as to have become the 
subject.
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purposes and to their clients.  Accountability, then, is a matter of degrees and a question of the 
level of continuing public support for the particular public policy purposes of organizations held 
to accountability standards. 
The second public accountability handle is the notion of the public. Public is a pregovernmental 
phenomenon. Governments float in a vast public sea. Engagement in the work of governmental 
jurisdictions is just one of the many ways groups and individuals are publicly engaged. It follows, 
then, that public accountability is greater than governmental accountability and may take many 
forms.
The third public accountability handle flows from the second, the prospects and hopes associated 
with applications of public accountability expectations on the part of nongovernmental organizations 
engaged in public work, often on the basis of governmental grants of contracts. Workable forms 
of public-private cooperation that are publicly accountable will require, we suggest, formalized 
expressions of the public-serving standards of nongovernmental organizations as well as the 
cultivation of corporate public accountability cultures.  The fourth public accountability handle is 
to recognize that accountability applications and practices are site, place, or context specific. Just as 
organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, may have cultures of accountability, so too 
do neighborhoods, clubs, churches, and other local public organizations. High levels of civic capital 
are distinctly associated with expectations of public accountability.
The fifth public accountability handle may not always provide a sure grip.  Although organizational 
performance measurement is often justified on premises of enhanced public accountability, the 
evidence is mixed. Performance measurement, if carefully and prudently done, is helpful, but it is 
not the same thing as public accountability.
The sixth public accountability handle is the salience of high-trust accountability cultures among 
the increasingly complex mix of organizations that implement government program in the 
Extended State. Such organizational arrangements are best when characterized by high levels of 
internal trust as well as high levels of public trust. Public accountability can also be found where 
there are high levels of interorganizational trust, built on years of effective so-called public-private 
partnerships. 
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Finally, in aspirational terms, public accountability’s highest potential is to be found in high-trust 
environments where governmental and nongovernmental organizations, working individually or 
together, are dedicated to public service and to accountability to the public. It is the building and 
maintenance of such an accountability culture that should mark the path forward.
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